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Abstract
This thesis comprises three sections. The first utilises novel data from a recently de-
veloped betting exchange to examine informational issues in market microstructure.
Among other things, the betting exchange allows us to observe (uncontrolled) private
information and learn about the behaviour of informed traders in a simple asset market.
The second section studies U.K. horse-racing for signs of conflict between horse owners
(principals) and trainers (agents). Trainers often prepare their own horses for races in
addition to having outsiders’ horses in their care. We find evidence of agent shirking, as
observed in other arenas, but also evidence of an informational rent - linked to betting
market manipulation - extracted by the agent. The third section takes a microscopic
look at market efficiency and the limits to arbitrage on a betting exchange. The arbi-
trage trade on which we focus is not subject to the most prominent limit - noise-trader
risk - which gives us a cleaner examination of the remaining limits to arbitrage.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The majority of economics papers on betting markets have focused on market efficiency
(see Vaughan Williams (2005) for a survey). As betting markets are short-lived, yield
easily-quantifiable final payoffs for the assets traded, and have a degree of repetition,
they have provided clean tests of efficiency. In this thesis, we utilise betting markets -
some new and some more established - to study three other fields in economics.
This is the first piece of work, as far as we are aware, to use betting exchanges
to explicitly analyse informational issues in market microstructure. In Chapter 2 we
examine the effect of market segmentation on price discovery. Specifically, do informed
bettors choose new markets which allow them to exploit the greater precision in their
information, or traditional markets which offer greater liquidity? In Chapter 3, we
consider the nature of informed trading on a betting exchange; in particular, do the
informed derive their advantage from private information or from a superior ability to
process public information?
In Chapter 4, we use betting market data to consider a fundamental question in
economics; namely, what effect does the separation of ownership and control have on
the payoff of the owner? We examine agency conflict in horse-racing, where many
trainers (agents) divide their time between the preparation of their own horses and
those of outsiders (principals). While the trainer receives all of the win purse if their
horse is successful, they receive only a fraction (typically 10%) for training an outsider’s
horse to victory. We examine whether the agent shirks in this environment and, further,
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whether the temptation of the accompanying betting market affects the behaviour of
the agent.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we return to market efficiency to consider a descendant of
this field - the limits to arbitrage. Recent work has focused on how these limits explain
market inefficiencies (see Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for a survey). We take an arbitrage
trade that is not subject to noise-trader risk and examine if arbitrage opportunities still
arise. If they do, which remaining limits to arbitrage are responsible?
References
• Gromb, D., Vayanos, D., (2010). Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory.
Paul Woolley Centre Working Paper.
• Vaughan Williams, L., (2005), Information Efficiency in Financial and Betting
Markets, Cambridge University Press.
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Chapter 2
The Importance of Liquidity: Price
Discovery in Segmented Markets on
a Betting Exchange
Abstract
Online bettors can now bet on sporting events via the traditional win bets, or with
a variety of new exotic bets, on which they wager on outcomes other than the winner of
the event. We propose that this presents informed bettors with a conundrum: trade in
the exotic market, where their precise private information is of most value, or trade in
the more liquid win market, where they can obtain better prices. Using in-play betting
data from the latter stages of The Wimbledon Tennis Championships in 2009, we find
that the price discovery contribution of exotic markets is negligible, suggesting that the
informed sacrifice a proportion of their private information in return for the liquidity,
and superior price execution, of the main win market. This result suggests that, in
general, creating more markets does not necessarily improve price discovery.
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2.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an explosion in the number of exotic betting markets, where
bettors wager on outcomes other than the winner of a sporting event. Punters can,
among other things, bet on the number of goals in a football match, the score in sets of
a tennis match, and the score from each ball in a cricket match. This development has
taken place at the same time as the growth of betting exchanges, which have increased
competition and reduced transaction costs, and the parallel rise of in-play betting,
where bettors can place bets on the outcome of a sporting event as it unfolds.
The most extreme exotic markets have recently attracted bad publicity. In August
2010, the Pakistan cricket team was caught up in an alleged ‘spot-fixing’ scandal, broken
by the U.K. tabloid newspaper, The News of the World. In this episode, a number of
players were accused of agreeing to bowl no-balls - where the bowler oversteps their
mark and forfeits a run to the opposing side - at pre-specified times, in return for cash
from a fake betting syndicate. This scandal followed a similar episode of alleged spot-
fixing in English county cricket in April of the same year (The Telegraph, May 31st
2010).1
Nevertheless, some exotic bets may allow informed bettors to exploit the greater
precision of their legally obtained information. As this information is revealed through
betting, this may aid the price discovery process. To support this proposition, The New
York Times and The Guardian (June 24th 2009) document an instance of bettors trad-
1An earlier instance of the dubious use of exotic betting markets has been found in football. In his
autobiography, Taking Le Tiss, the Southampton player Matt Le Tissier admits betting on the time
of the first throw-in in a match in April 1995. The bet in this case was a spread bet, where a bettor is
liable for the degree to which they are wrong with their prediction. Having predicted an early throw-in,
Le Tissier planned to kick the ball straight out from the kick-off. The following passage describes how
his teammate Neil Shipperley unwittingly sabotaged his bet. ‘As it was live on TV, I didn’t want to
make it too obvious or end up looking like a prat for miscuing the ball, so I tried to hit it just over
his head. But, with so much riding on it, I was a bit nervous and didn’t give it enough welly. The
problem was that Shipps knew nothing about the bet and managed to reach it and head it back into
play. I have never run so much in my life..as I charged round the pitch desperately trying to kick the
ball out of play.’ The ball eventually went out after 70 seconds, meaning no money was won or lost.
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ing on private information on a tennis match in the first round of the Men’s Wimbledon
Championships. The Austrian Jurgen Melzer was drawn to play the American Wayne
Odesnik. Prior to the match, information leaked on a minor injury to Odesnik. As a
result, a number of insiders bet large quantities, not on Melzer to win, but on Melzer
to win 3-0 (the eventual score), thereby leveraging their precise information.
The market microstructure literature does, however, suggest that there is a trade-
off.2 If informed bettors were to disproportionately congregate in the exotic market,
then the liquidity in this market, and their ability to execute their bets at advantageous
prices, would diminish. As the proportion of informed in a trading population increases,
those providing liquidity will widen the bid-ask spread (e.g. Copeland and Galai (1983)
and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), and limit the volume available to trade (e.g. DuPont
2000). In this chapter, we seek to ascertain which effect dominates. Do the informed
trade in the exotic market, where their precise information is of most value, or does
the lower liquidity in exotic markets force them back into the main win market, where
they can hide amongst the uninformed?
In this study we examine in-play betting, on a betting exchange, on a series of tennis
matches in the 2009 Wimbledon tournament. In tennis betting markets, a bettor can
replicate a bet on a player to win with a series of bets in the set market. By constructing
a replicating portfolio, we can examine whether price discovery takes place in the win
market or in the exotic set market. By using a similar methodology to Garbade and
Silber (1983) and Hasbrouck (1995), we are able to calculate the information share of
each type of market. We find that the win market provides most, if not all, of the
price discovery in tennis markets. In other words, the informed sacrifice a proportion
of their information in return for the liquidity of the win market and the superior price
execution it promises. This result suggests that, in general, creating more markets does
not necessarily improve price discovery.
2The market microstructure literature examines the effect of the trading mechanism - and economic
frictions such as asymmetric information and liquidity-control - on prices in financial markets. Promi-
nent surveys include O’Hara (1995), Madhavan (2000), Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005) and Hasbrouck
(2007). For a focus on limit order books, see Parlour and Seppi (2008).
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Betting markets have long provided an interesting setting for studies of market
efficiency.3 In contrast to many financial assets, betting assets are short-lived, allowing
bettors to hold profitable assets until maturity. This circumvents many of the limits
to arbitrage present in financial markets.4 The structure of the betting exchange in
our study is almost identical to that found on most financial exchanges. The exchange
operates as a continuous double auction, with long or short positions possible, and the
option of market orders (executed at prices in the book) or limit orders (which sit in
the book until an offsetting order arrives).
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the related
empirical literature in financial and betting markets. Section 2.3 outlines the structure
of the betting exchange and the data, while Section 2.4 contains the empirical model
and results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The ideas covered in this chapter relate to three strands of the financial economics
literature. The first strand looks at price discovery in segmented markets. It is possible
to trade the same asset in a number of geographical regions and to gain an exposure
to the same collection of cash flows through a variety of different asset structures (e.g.
stocks, options, futures etc.). A literature has therefore emerged to locate where price
discovery takes place, and by implication, where the informed trade.
Stocks can be traded in ‘dominant’ markets and in ‘satellite’ markets. Hasbrouck
(1995) looks at the relative contribution of the New York Stock Exchange and regional
exchanges - such as those found in Boston, Philadelphia and Cincinnati - to price
discovery. Using a methodology developed along the lines of Garbade and Silber (1983),
the author calculates the information share of each exchange. Among the thirty Dow
3For a survey of the betting market efficiency literature, see Vaughan Williams (2005) and Hausch
and Ziemba (2008).
4The presence of noise-traders, who may drive prices further from fundamentals, constitutes a risk
to arbitrage in most financial markets. For a survey of this and other limits to arbitrage, see Gromb
and Vayanos (2010).
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stocks, the median contribution of the NYSE to price discovery is found to be 92.7%.
Other studies have looked at the relative contributions of stock and option mar-
kets to price discovery. Starting with Black (1975), it has been argued that informed
traders will favour the option market, where their precise information can be leveraged
with small initial capital outlays. Chakravarty et al (2004) modify Hasbrouck’s (1995)
methodology to capture the arbitrage relationships between stock and option markets.
Using a data set of stock and option prices for 60 firms over 5 years, they find that
the option market contributes around 17% of price discovery. The authors also found
that the contribution of option markets was highest in out-of-the-money options, where
they were making highly leveraged, and precise, predictions about future stock price
movements. Other authors, including Easley at al (1998), have also tied the volume
found in option markets to the presence of informed traders.
The second strand of the literature examines the relationship between liquidity
and market efficiency. In an effort to explain the post-earnings announcement drift
- which shows that asset prices do not completely and instantaneously incorporate
all information contained in announcements - Chordia et al (2006) examine the drift
for liquid and illiquid stocks. The authors find that illiquid stocks display a greater
drift than liquid stocks (1.79% compared to 0.24%) and that most of the returns on
offer are absorbed by the transaction costs of illiquidity. Chordia et al (2008) look at
the more general short-run predictability of returns against liquidity. Again, illiquid
stocks display the greatest predictability, suggesting that liquid markets are quicker to
incorporate information and attain efficiency. Tetlock (2008) examines the relationship
between liquidity and market efficiency on a betting exchange, TradeSports, similar
to that used in our study. In contrast to the earlier results in financial markets, the
author finds that liquid markets are no bettor predictors of event outcomes, i.e. no
more efficient, than illiquid markets.5
5Other studies of betting exchange efficiency include Smith et al (2006) and Tetlock (2004), who
examine the favourite-longshot bias, and Zitzewitz (2006), who looks at the information contained in
short-term binary financial options. Spann and Skiera (2009) compare the predictive capacity of a
prediction market with that of professional tipsters and bookmakers.
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There is a third related strand of the literature, focusing on the efficiency of exotic
betting markets. Comparing the returns to win bets and the returns of a replicating
portfolio composed of exotic bets, in horse-racing, the following studies focus on the
pari-mutuel market, where the payout is inversely proportional to the amount wagered
on an outcome. Ali (1979) examines the efficiency of win and exotic markets from
1079 observations from U.S. racetracks in 1975, and finds that win and exotic markets
efficiently price equivalent bets. On the other hand, Asch and Quandt (1987) - using
data from 705 races at Meadowland racetrack in 1984 - find inefficiencies, albeit ineffi-
ciencies which do not yield a profit to the bettor once the track take is acknowledged.
For further examples of these studies, see Hausch et al (2008).
With respect to the efficiency of tennis betting markets, a recent paper by Easton
and Uylangco (2009) uses betting exchange data to compare the point-by-point pricing
of a player to win, with that suggested in a theoretical point-by-point model. They find
that the (main win) betting market is relatively efficient, and in some cases, correctly
anticipates the significance of the outcome of a service game. Other features, such as
the tendency of players to lose a number of points after having their serve broken, are
less well captured. The efficiency of tennis betting markets, with respect to expected
returns, is also considered in Forrest and McHale (2007).
2.3 The Exchange
In our study we used betting price data from Betfair, the most prominent betting
exchange in the U.K.. Betfair provides a public limit order book for the exchange of
bets on a variety of sporting events. The book operates as a continuous double auction,
with prices quoted in the form of back odds (where the bettor places a stake and receives
the stake multiplied by the odds if the outcome occurs) and lay odds (where the stake
is accepted and the bettor is liable for the stake multiplied by the odds if the outcome
occurs). As with other exchanges, bettors can place market orders, at prices currently
in the book, or limit orders, which reside in the book until an offsetting order arrives.
As there is no designated market-maker, limit orders represent the sole provision of
13
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liquidity on the exchange.
For tennis matches, there are bets traded on the winner of the match, and also the
score in sets. Both of these markets operate during play. This allows us to continuously
compare the implied probability of a player winning, as defined by the win market, with
the implied probability defined by the exotic set market. Suppose that there were back
and lay odds of BW and LW respectively for a player to win. For each 1 unit staked (or
backed) on this outcome, BW would be returned in addition to the stake if the player
wins. For each unit laid, LW would be lost if the player wins. Taking the midpoint of
the spread as the asset’s value, these odds imply the probability of the player winning
is
W =
1
BW+1
+ 1
LW+1
2
(2.1)
At the same time, suppose the set market quotes back (lay) odds of B0 (L0), B1
(L1) and B2 (L2) on the same player to win 3-0, 3-1 and 3-2 respectively. This implies
the probability of the player winning is
S =
1
B0+1
+ 1
L0+1
2
+
1
B1+1
+ 1
L1+1
2
+
1
B2+1
+ 1
L2+1
2
(2.2)
For our analysis we examined 7 matches from the latter stages of the Men’s Wimble-
don Tennis Championships in 2009, as these matches provide the most liquid markets.
This data was obtained from Fracsoft, who market Betfair historical pricing data. This
data includes the in-play quoted back and lay odds, and associated volumes, for each
player in a match to win, and also the score in sets. Using this data we calculated the
implied probabilities, W and S, as defined above.
Table 2.1 describes the summary statistics on liquidity for 14 players in those 7
matches. Liquidity is on average lower in the set market than the win market. This is
reflected by wider back-lay spreads and lower volumes. The microstructure literature
predicts that liquidity will decrease as the proportion of informed in a trading popula-
tion increases. Our statistics suggest that liquidity providers expect that the informed
disproportionately congregate in the exotic set market, to fully exploit the greater pre-
cision of their information. Those providing liquidity therefore increase the cost of
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trading in this market to limit their losses. In the next section we analyse whether this
cost is sufficient to deter the informed.
Match Player IP Win Volume Set Volume Win Spread Set Spread
Roddick Federer 1 0.12 1930.18 136.19 0.0083 0.0349
2 0.88 61828.55 349.78 0.0071 0.0300
Murray Roddick 1 0.72 18924.43 214.03 0.0072 0.0305
2 0.28 6024.76 164.41 0.0075 0.0268
Federer Hass 1 0.92 387540.39 403.25 0.0088 0.0231
2 0.08 975.21 44.83 0.0029 0.0174
Karlovic Federer 1 0.11 600.58 90.12 0.0028 0.0242
2 0.9 333568.71 357.85 0.0090 0.0532
Roddick Hewitt 1 0.72 36478.41 289.12 0.0072 0.1071
2 0.28 1953.24 112.66 0.0149 0.0988
Djokovic Hass 1 0.69 5222.11 234.49 0.0124 0.0986
2 0.31 12932.82 281.29 0.0082 0.0641
Murray Ferrero 1 0.89 133966.01 411.14 0.0077 0.0428
2 0.11 522.13 44.96 0.0050 0.0385
Table 2.1. Liquidity: Summary Statistics. This table describes the starting implied probability, and the average
(back-lay) spread and volume in both the win and set markets, for 14 players to win in 7 different matches, from the
quarter-final stages onwards of the Men’s Wimbledon Tennis Championships in 2009. Volume in the set market is the
summation of volume for all three bets. Liquidity is lower, in the form of wider spreads and lower volumes, in the set
market for all 14 players.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
The model of price discovery described in this chapter is based on the model of Garbade
and Silber (1983), who looked at the relative price discovery of spot and futures markets
in a number of commodities. Underpinning this model is the idea that any divergence
in prices of identical assets in segmented markets will be rapidly arbitraged.
To confirm this in our setting, we looked at the duration of arbitrage opportunities
between the win and exotic set market on Betfair. Chapter 5 provides a detailed
discussion of arbitrage strategies and the remaining limits to arbitrage on Betfair. A
bettor can arbitrage price differences by taking a long (short) position in the win (set)
market and taking an offsetting short (long) position in the set (win) market. In Table
15
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2.2 we describe summary statistics of the duration of arbitrage opportunities for these
two strategies, for the 14 players of our study.
Match Player Strategy mean s.d. med. max. IQR Freq. N
Roddick Federer 1 1 7.51 11.97 4.00 67 6.00 6.45 5032
2 4.67 2.08 4.00 7 2.00 0.28 5032
2 1 3.28 2.74 2.00 9 3.00 2.46 2395
2 9.50 11.54 4.50 36 4.75 3.97 2395
Murray Roddick 1 1 12.25 12.69 7.00 31 9.75 2.20 2259
2 8.93 10.52 3.50 37 13.25 5.53 2259
2 1 6.15 8.21 3.00 26 4.00 1.88 4333
2 14.29 20.09 8.00 73 10.75 4.62 4333
Federer Hass 1 1 5.10 3.86 4.00 13 3.25 1.50 7370
2 7.31 5.55 6.50 22 5.50 1.60 7370
2 1 7.00 6.98 6.50 14 11.50 1.11 2805
2 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00 2805
Karlovic Federer 1 1 7.00 NA 7.00 7 0.00 1.35 1352
2 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00 1352
2 1 15.25 10.53 16.00 27 10.75 2.03 6186
2 3.67 1.15 3.00 5 1.00 0.18 6186
Roddick Hewitt 1 1 7.95 6.01 6.00 21 6.50 6.42 5334
2 2.50 0.71 2.50 3 0.50 0.09 5334
2 1 1.00 NA 1.00 1 0.00 26.09 1646
2 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00 1646
Djokovic Hass 1 1 12.00 NA 12.00 12 0.00 1.61 2744
2 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00 2744
2 1 4.33 3.21 3.00 8 3.00 0.24 7879
2 11.19 15.64 5.50 73 10.75 3.69 7879
Murray Ferrero 1 1 8.19 12.23 3.50 63 8.25 3.90 6140
2 8.09 5.47 7.00 19 6.00 1.49 6140
2 1 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00 2726
2 27.06 38.02 6.00 144 48.00 16.87 2726
Table 2.2. Arbitrage Duration: Summary Statistics. This table describes summary statistics on the duration of
arbitrage strategies for the 14 players, in 7 matches, of the Men’s Wimbledon Tennis Championships in 2009. Strategy
1 (2) consists of betting on (against) a player to win in the win market, and betting against (on) the same player to
win in the exotic set market. Durations are calculated whilst all set outcomes are possible, and a 2% commission on net
winnings is assumed. For a detailed discussion of these strategies, and arbitrage on Betfair, see Chapter 6.
We observe that arbitrage opportunities are frequent during play, occuring in all 7
matches studied, and can persist, lasting for 144 seconds in the case of Ferrero strategy
2. However, most opportunities are quickly removed, with the median duration of
16
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arbitrage opportunities below 10 seconds for all but two of the samples. Figure 2.1
provides further evidence of the close pricing relationship between the win market and
the exotic set market. Taking data from the Final itself, it appears that arbitrage
pressures ensure that any pricing deviations between the win and set markets are short-
lived. For this series, and for all others subsequently considered, we also conducted non-
parametric Phillips-Perron tests to confirm that the difference in win and set prices was
stationary. The presence of a unit root was rejected in all cases so this allows for the
use of a Garbade and Silber-type model.6
0 500 1000 1500
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
T
W
−S
Figure 2.1: The difference in the probability of a Roger Federer win in the 2009 Wimble-
don Final, as implied by the win market, Equation (2.1), and the set market, Equation
(2.2). Prices sampled at 10 second intervals during the match.
For our analysis we estimated the following two regressions:
Wt −Wt−1 = β0 + β1(St−1 −Wt−1) + t (2.3)
St − St−1 = α0 + α1(Wt−1 − St−1) + ut (2.4)
6The Garbade and Silber (1983) model differs from Hasbrouck (1995) in that only 2 price series,
rather than n, are sampled, and that only one lag is used. As our setting utilises only two prices,
and because arbitrage opportunities disappear after one lag, we use the simpler Garbade and Silber
framework.
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where Wt is the implied probability of a player winning in the win market, as defined
in Equation (2.1), St is the implied probability of the same player winning in the exotic
set market, as defined in Equation (2.2), and t and ut are error terms. The idea is
to examine how the two markets respond to a divergence in implied probabilities. For
example, if a divergence (Wt−1 − St−1) causes a subsequent shift in the set market
implied probability (St − St−1), we can conclude that the win market has hosted the
price discovery, and the set market responds to arbitrage pressures. On the other hand,
if the set market hosts all the price discovery, we would expect that the divergence
(Wt−1−St−1) is followed by a change in the win market implied probability (Wt−Wt−1).
Using the estimated results of Equations (2.3) and (2.4), the contribution of the win
market to price discovery is defined as
α1
β1 + α1
(2.5)
and the contribution of the set market to price discovery is defined as
β1
β1 + α1
(2.6)
To illustrate the model, consider an instance where the exotic set market implies a
probability of 30% for a player winning, whilst the win market implies a 20% probability.
If the win market provides all of the price discovery, we would expect that, in one
period’s time, the set market would also imply a 20% win probability. In this case, the
informed are all trading in the win market, and the set market follows the win market
due to arbitrage pressures. On the other hand, suppose we estimate that the set market
provides 40% of the price discovery. Taking the same example, we would expect both
markets to reflect an implied probability of 24% in the next time period. If this were
the case, we would expect that some informed bettors were using the set market to
trade.
In Table 2.3 we outline the estimation of Equations (2.3) and (2.4) for our 14 players.
We estimated the two equations with sampling at intervals of 10 seconds to reflect the
brevity of arbitrage opportunities outlined in Table 2.2. We found that the contribution
of the exotic set market to price discovery was not significant for 12 of the 14 players.
18
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Of the other two, the set market was found to contribute 1.4%, and 58.5%. The outlier,
in this case, is the 58.5% found in the market for Federer to beat Hass in the semi-finals
of the tournament. Observing the measures of liquidity described in Table 2.1, we can
see that the set market on Federer to beat Hass displayed greater liquidity - in the form
of higher volume and narrower spreads - than most of the set markets. With a Federer
win a near inevitability (with a pre-match probability of 92%), this suggests that those
providing liquidity in the set market did not see this market to be purely the preserve of
the informed. With the cost of trading here therefore lowered, a subset of the informed
appear to have chosen the exotic market for this particular match.
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Match Player β0 β1 Adj.R
2 α0 α1 Adj.R
2 N Exotic Cont.
Roddick Federer 1 -0.0001 0.0299 0.0055 0.0016 0.3209 0.1600 1544 0.085
(0.000338) (0.019252) (0.000585)** (0.068396)***
2 -0.0001 -0.0179 0.0006 -0.0014 0.5291 0.2400 1548 -0.035
(0.000332) (0.023239) (0.000696)* (0.055127)***
Murray Roddick 1 -0.0003 0.0065 -0.0007 -0.0030 0.3233 0.1626 1125 0.020
(0.000436) (0.016510) (0.000860)*** (0.042034)***
2 0.0005 -0.0123 -0.0002 0.0042 0.3762 0.1949 1125 -0.034
(0.000439) (0.019080) (0.000936)*** (0.044229)***
Federer Hass 1 -0.0020 0.0951 0.0367 0.0006 0.0676 0.0532 736 0.585*
(0.001316) (0.044349)* (0.000459) (0.035496).
2 -0.0001 -0.0043 0.0008 0.0015 0.2328 0.1173 736 -0.019
(8.11E-05) (0.003584) (0.000598)* (0.071488)**
Karlovic Federer 1 -0.000212 0.0020 0.0009 0.0031 0.1450 0.0684 618 0.014*
(8.65E-05)* (0.000958)* (0.000883)*** (0.037602)***
2 -0.0014 0.0182 0.0053 0.0090 0.1994 0.0897 618 0.084
(-0.001214) (0.014413) (0.003148)** (0.050296)***
Roddick Hewitt 1 0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0022 0.1943 0.0940 1385 -0.005
(0.000446) (0.004205) (0.002280) (0.047630)***
2 -0.0001 0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0012 0.1625 0.0792 1385 0.013
(0.000432) (0.003886) (0.001536) (0.053059)**
Djokovic Hass 1 -0.0005 0.0031 -0.0007 -0.0106 0.2619 0.1314 987 0.012
(0.000588) (0.004557) (0.002437)*** (0.038705)***
2 0.0008 0.0058 0.0001 -0.0074 0.4005 0.2022 987 0.014
(0.000520) (0.004453) (0.003126)* (0.063062)***
Murray Ferrero 1 -0.0002 -0.0110 0.0039 0.0030 0.1150 0.0621 614 -0.106
(0.000447) (0.010368) (0.001675). (0.046058)*
2 -0.0002 0.0063 0.0016 -0.0015 0.2541 0.1233 614 0.024
(0.000189) (0.004851) (0.001158) (0.057625)***
Table 2.3. Price Discovery: Results. This table describes the results of the estimation of Equations (2.3) and (2.4). These equations examine the contribution to price discovery of the win market and
the exotic set market. For this analysis, pricing samples were taken at intervals of 10 seconds for the full duration of each match. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation -consistent standard
errors are in parentheses and .,*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively. The price discovery contribution of the exotic set market, as defined in Equation (2.6), is
presented in the final column.
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As mentioned in the introduction, informed traders can use exotic betting markets
to leverage their precise information. However, the decline in liquidity that follows
informed traders - as counterparties seek to limit their losses with wider spreads and
lower volumes - appears to dominate the decision of where to trade. If exotic markets
do not contribute to price discovery, the question remains as to their practical value.
One concern may be the omission of autoregressive terms from Equations (2.3) and
(2.4). It is possible that these may be confounding factors, and that price changes
are temporally dependent. This may cause us to apportion too much weight to price
discovery observed in the win market. We therefore ran the supplementary regressions,
of Equations (2.7) and (2.8), that follow this paragraph. As illustrated in Table 2.4, the
autoregressive terms are predominantly statistically insignificant, and the win market
is still the prime driver of price discovery.
Wt −Wt−1 = β0 + β1(St−1 −Wt−1) + β2(Wt−1 −Wt−2) + t (2.7)
St − St−1 = α0 + α1(Wt−1 − St−1) + α2(St−1 − St−2) + ut (2.8)
Further, up until this point we have analysed the contribution of exotic markets to
price discovery for the whole duration of each match. This includes times when there
are three possible scores by which a player could win, but also times when a player can
only win by two scores (when they have lost a set), and by only one score (when they
have lost two sets). To ensure the robustness of our results we re-estimated Equations
(2.3) and (2.4), breaking down the contribution of the exotic market into when there
were three, two, and one set score(s) possible. Perhaps the degree of precision required
to pick between three scores is too high for all but the most informed, but the precision
required to distinguish between two possible scores is within reach of a larger proportion
of bettors. If this allows the informed to blend in with others in exotic markets, this
may increase the proportion of price discovery that originates here.
21
E
ssa
y
s
o
n
th
e
E
co
n
o
m
ics
o
f
B
ettin
g
M
a
rkets
Match Player β0 β1 β2 Adj.R
2 α0 α1 α2 Adj.R
2 N Exotic Cont.
Roddick Federer 1 -0.0001 0.0273 -0.0345 0.0060 0.0016 0.3183 -0.0093 0.1595 1543 0.079
(0.000348) (0.019291) (0.034301) (0.000608)** (0.063482)*** (0.058400)
2 -0.0001 -0.0237 -0.0839 0.0070 -0.0015 0.5153 -0.0712 0.2518 1543 -0.048
(0.000355) (0.023916) (0.030533)** (0.000698)* (0.053537)*** (0.066421)
Murray Roddick 1 -0.0002 0.0186 0.1291 0.0143 -0.0028 0.2848 -0.1620 0.1858 1124 0.061
(0.000399) (0.016310) (0.039570)** (0.000833)*** (0.036609)*** (0.057278)**
2 0.0004 -0.0066 0.0481 0.0011 0.0042 0.3773 0.0038 0.1943 1124 -0.018
(0.000434) (0.018859) (0.044270) (0.000955)*** (0.048768)*** (0.054787)
Federer Hass 1 -0.0021 0.1043 0.0630 0.0390 0.0005 0.0650 -0.1358 0.0703 735 0.616
(0.001350) (0.048382)* (0.026008)* (0.000474) (0.036173). (0.082843) *
2 -0.0001 -0.0050 -0.0825 0.0063 0.0014 0.2318 -0.0045 0.1161 735 -0.022
(8.57E-05) (0.003888) (0.067359) (0.000628)* (0.072506)** (0.075127)
Karlovic Federer 1 -0.0002 0.0021 0.0718 0.0044 0.0028 0.1257 -0.1235 0.0810 617 0.016
(7.54E-05)** (0.000993)* (0.086117) (0.000853)** (0.033842)*** (0.066111). *
2 -0.0014 0.0183 0.0059 0.0038 0.0084 0.1842 -0.0678 0.0923 617 0.090
(0.001217) (0.014452) (0.006373) (0.003116)** (0.050523)*** (0.057083)
Roddick Hewitt 1 0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0070 -0.0014 -0.0018 0.1657 -0.1519 0.1144 1384 -0.006
(0.000450) (0.004240) (0.023777) (0.002257) (0.044171)*** (0.043050)***
2 -0.0001 0.0021 -0.0037 -0.0013 -0.0011 0.1365 -0.1733 0.1062 1384 0.015
(0.000433) (0.003937) (0.032703) (0.001491) (0.045183)** (0.064718)**
Djokovic Hass 1 -0.0006 0.0025 -0.0341 -0.0005 -0.0094 0.2274 -0.1391 0.1476 986 0.011
(0.000607) (0.004702) (0.027385) (0.002326)*** (0.033615)*** (0.077984).
2 0.0008 0.0054 -0.0192 -0.0006 -0.0072 0.3930 -0.0196 0.2017 986 0.013
(0.000528) (0.004522) (0.034035) (0.003180)* (0.067125)*** (0.037724)
Murray Ferrero 1 -0.0002 -0.0118 -0.0226 0.0027 0.0025 0.1054 -0.1358 0.0762 613 -0.126
(0.000434) (0.011535) (0.017377) (0.001829) (0.043778)** (0.093601)
2 -0.0002 0.0063 0.0035 0.0000 -0.0015 0.2521 -0.0076 0.1219 613 0.025
(0.000188) (0.004849) (0.036154) (0.001148) (0.060715)*** (0.072604)
Table 2.4. Price Discovery: Results (including autoregressive terms). This table describes the results of the estimation of Equations (2.7) and (2.8). These equations examine the contribution
to price discovery of the win market and the exotic set market. For this analysis, pricing samples were taken at intervals of 10 seconds for the full duration of each match. Newey-West heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation -consistent standard errors are in parentheses and .,*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively. The price discovery contribution of the exotic set
market, as defined in Equation (2.6), is presented in the final column.
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Table 2.5 outlines the results of this estimation. The contribution of the exotic set
market is highest when there are three outcomes, with two player markets displaying
a significant contribution. When a player loses a set and there are only two possible
outcomes, the set market does not provide a significant contribution to price discovery
for any of the matches. This result suggests that providing less extreme exotic markets,
which more closely resemble the main win market, would not lead to a greater hosting
of price discovery.
Exotic Cont. Exotic Cont. Exotic Cont. Exotic Cont.
Match Player All 3 outcomes 2 outcomes 1 outcome
Roddick Federer 1 0.0852 0.0699 0.0582 0.1147
2 -0.035 0.0194 -0.1188 0.1026
. Murray Roddick 1 0.020 0.0433 0.0431 0.0062
2 -0.034 0.1252 -0.0714
Federer Hass 1 0.585* 0.5845*
2 -0.019 -0.0220 -0.0107 0.0645
Karlovic Federer 1 0.014* 0.0745. 0.0089 0.0026
2 0.084 0.0835
Roddick Hewitt 1 -0.005 -0.0054 0.0059 0.0067
2 0.013 0.0059 0.0254 0.0243
Djokovic Hass 1 0.012 -0.0622 0.0361 0.0274
2 0.014 0.0112 0.0542
Murray Ferrero 1 -0.106 -0.1057
2 0.024 0.0215 0.0500 0.0474
Table 2.5. Price Discovery: Exotic Market Contribution (Number of Outcomes). This table describes the
contribution of the exotic set market to price discovery (as defined in Equation (2.6)), for the whole match, and when
broken down into times when there are three possible set outcomes, two possible set outcomes (when a set has been
lost), and one possible set outcome (when two sets have been lost). ., *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, 1% and 0.1% level respectively.
In our analysis thus far, we have also assumed that all divergences between the win
and set market are reconciled within 10 seconds. Perhaps arbitrageable divergences are,
but smaller divergences take longer to disappear. Bettors must post collateral to bet in
separate win and set markets, and therefore some opportunities may be left on the table
until a larger opportunity arises. A second problem arises in estimating Equations (2.3)
and (2.4) in high frequency data. If trade is infrequent, it is possible that our estimates
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of β1 and α1 are downwardly biased. The downward bias may be most pronounced in
the set market if trade is particularly infrequent there. To check the robustness of our
results to these possibilities, we re-estimated Equations (2.3) and (2.4), sampling at
intervals of 30 seconds and 60 seconds. The results of these estimations are shown in
Tables 2.6 and 2.7.
We found our results were robust to these possibilities. When sampling takes place at
intervals of 30 seconds, the exotic set market still only provides a significant contribution
to price discovery in two instances. These contributions total 1.7% and 69.8%. Again,
it is the market on Federer to beat Hass that constitutes the outlier. For sampling at
60 second intervals, there is no significant contribution from the set market. Perhaps
more importantly, the sum of the coefficients β1 and α1 is increasing in the sampling
interval, therefore making it less likely that infrequent trade is driving our results.
In summary, we find that the contribution of the exotic set market to price discovery
is negligible. If informed bettors are expected to congregate in a particular market -
where their precise information can be leveraged - then liquidity decreases. This decline
in liquidity appears to deter the informed and force them back into the main win market,
where they can operate under the camouflage of less informed bettors. As our results
are found in a relatively benign form of exotic market, where only three exotic bets
are needed to replicate a win bet, we would not expect to see improvements in price
discovery for the extreme spot-fixing exotic markets mentioned in the news recently.
It should be noted that the framework used in our analysis does not allow for the
inventory considerations of liquidity providers. We neglect such considerations because
we do not have data on the orders taken by individual liquidity providers, and looking
at liquidity provision at a market-wide level may lead to inaccurate conclusions. This
is because many of the bookmakers use betting exchanges to offset exposure taken in
betting shops and on their own websites. Therefore, what may appear to be a liquidity
provider taking a large position may actually be a hedge. Nevertheless, should the nec-
essary data become available, further work could incorporate inventory considerations
to address the potential limitations of our analysis.
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Match Player β0 β1 Adj.R
2 α0 α1 Adj.R
2 N Exotic Cont.
Roddick Federer 1 0.0000 0.0119 -0.0012 0.0031 0.6086 0.3859 516 0.019
(0.000981) (0.015182) (0.001617). (0.119501)***
2 -0.0001 0.0025 -0.0019 -0.0014 0.7360 0.2782 516 0.003
(0.000988) (0.044368) (0.001468) (0.069753)***
Murray Roddick 1 -0.0007 0.0649 0.0032 -0.0045 0.5125 0.2095 375 0.112
(0.001286) (0.047386) (0.001996)* (0.077116)***
2 0.0005 0.0667 0.0037 0.0069 0.5966 0.2404 375 0.101
(0.001162) (0.035120). (0.002050)*** (0.092480)***
Federer Hass 1 -0.0060 0.2994 0.1231 0.0008 0.1295 0.1098 245 0.698
(0.004540) (0.118091)* (0.001004) (0.076264). *
2 -0.0003 -0.0074 -0.0015 0.0037 0.5735 0.2824 245 -0.013
(0.000216) (0.008303) (0.001642)* (0.133423)***
Karlovic Federer 1 -0.0006 0.0063 0.0026 0.0079 0.3717 0.1734 206 0.017
(0.000305). (0.003508)* (0.002481)** (0.100404)*** *
2 -0.0041 0.0539 0.0146 0.0173 0.3982 0.1687 206 0.119
(0.003419) (0.048823) (0.007723)* (0.116088)***
Roddick Hewitt 1 0.0004 -0.0081 -0.0011 -0.0030 0.3449 0.1605 461 -0.024
(0.001311) (0.011466) (0.004868) (0.081499)***
2 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0027 0.2881 0.1319 461 -0.002
(0.001297) (0.009771) (0.003549) (0.092202)**
Djokovic Hass 1 -0.0025 -0.0145 -0.0003 -0.0210 0.5415 0.2680 329 -0.028
(0.001703) (0.015071) (0.005412)*** (0.093687)***
2 0.0025 0.0212 0.0027 -0.0153 0.7859 0.3719 329 0.026
(0.001639) (0.018111) (0.006076)* (0.091371)***
Murray Ferrero 1 -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0049 0.0083 0.2468 0.1618 204 -0.009
(0.002526) (0.003565) (0.003849)* (0.092705)**
2 -0.0005 0.0154 0.0010 -0.0035 0.5160 0.2513 204 0.029
(0.000632) (0.015157) (0.002578) (0.125124)***
Table 2.6. Price Discovery: Results (30s intervals). This table describes the results of the estimation of Equations (2.3) and (2.4). These equations examine the contribution to price discovery of
the win market and the exotic set market. For this analysis, pricing samples were taken at intervals of 30 seconds for the full duration of each match. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
-consistent standard errors are in parentheses and .,*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively. The price discovery contribution of the exotic set market, as defined
in Equation (2.6), is presented in the final column.
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Match Player β0 β1 Adj.R
2 α0 α1 Adj.R
2 N Exotic Cont.
Roddick Federer 1 0.0001 0.0097 -0.0037 0.0030 0.9244 0.5896 258 0.010
(0.001939) (0.036046) (0.002120) (0.077408)***
2 -0.0001 -0.0647 -0.0001 0.0000 0.9065 0.2928 258 -0.077
(0.001953) (0.068190) (0.002633) (0.081680)***
Murray Roddick 1 -0.0022 0.0448 -0.0035 -0.0066 0.5296 0.1713 187 0.078
(0.002397) (0.098979) (0.003419). (0.148516)***
2 0.0031 -0.0550 -0.0031 0.0103 0.6542 0.1828 187 -0.092
(0.002832) (0.104482) (0.004378)* (0.156003)***
Federer Hass 1 -0.0069 0.2407 0.0861 0.0022 0.0906 0.1031 122 0.726
(0.006233) (0.208085) (0.001527) (0.070609)
2 -0.000508 -0.01624 0.00367 0.006947 0.834016 0.409713 122 -0.020
(0.000395) (0.016701) (0.003216)* (0.107058)***
Karlovic Federer 1 -0.0012 0.0107 -0.0012 0.0113 0.5618 0.2541 103 0.019
(0.000712) (0.007909) (0.004399)* (0.159010)***
2 -0.0083 0.1033 0.0275 0.0330 0.7232 0.3090 103 0.125
(0.007005) (0.087115) (0.016482)* (0.179436)***
Roddick Hewitt 1 0.0007 -0.0136 -0.0028 -0.0043 0.4546 0.2002 230 -0.031
(0.002540) (0.022533) (0.007821) (0.124565)***
2 -0.0007 0.0066 -0.0041 -0.0036 0.3441 0.1587 230 0.019
(0.002487) (0.027421) (0.005886) (0.139641)*
Djokovic Hass 1 -0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0061 -0.0248 0.5250 0.2302 164 -0.009
(0.003422) (0.024291) (0.007767)** (0.092921)***
2 0.0044 0.0098 -0.0057 -0.0151 0.9123 0.4236 164 0.011
(0.003168) (0.037739) (0.009268) (0.171670)***
Murray Ferrero 1 -0.0037 -0.0029 -0.0099 0.0156 0.3934 0.2574 102 -0.007
(0.005323) (0.012608) (0.007307)* (0.121573)**
2 -0.0011 0.0100 -0.0087 -0.0045 0.6403 0.3007 102 0.015
(0.001403) (0.027589) (0.003991) (0.145423)***
Table 2.7. Price Discovery: Results (60s intervals). This table describes the results of the estimation of Equations (2.3) and (2.4). These equations examine the contribution to price discovery of
the win market and the exotic set market. For this analysis, pricing samples were taken at intervals of 60 seconds for the full duration of each match. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
-consistent standard errors are in parentheses and .,*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively. The price discovery contribution of the exotic set market, as defined
in Equation (2.6), is presented in the final column.
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2.5 Conclusion
A recent scandal surrounding alleged ‘spot-fixing’ in cricket has focused negative atten-
tion on the more extreme exotic bets available. Nevertheless, it could be argued that
exotic bets - which allow for wagering on outcomes other than the winner of a sporting
event - allow the informed to capitalise on their precise, legally obtained, information.
As information is revealed through betting, this may aid price discovery. On the other
hand, if the informed were to disproportionately assemble in the exotic market, liquidity
would decrease as those providing liquidity seek to limit their losses. If this illiquidity
subsequently drives the informed out, this would leave the exotic market without any
practical purpose.
Using in-play pricing data from the Men’s Wimbledon Tennis Championship in
2009, we found that the price discovery contribution of the exotic set betting market
was negligible. This suggests that providing large numbers of miniscule events for
punters to bet on will have little impact on our ability to forecast events. Only when a
player winning was a near inevitability - and the win market nearly became obsolete -
did the exotic market contribute the majority of price discovery.
Our results have implications for the prediction markets literature. A prediction
market facilitates wagering on the probability of an event, much like a betting mar-
ket, but also ‘produce[s] information externalities that can inform business and policy
decisions’.7 As markets are relatively efficient in aggregating dispersed information,
studies have found that our ability to forecast events is aided by a prediction market
(see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) and Snowberg et al (2008) for surveys of the litera-
ture). It would be natural, therefore, to assume that increasing the number of markets
would increase our overall forecasting ability. Our results suggest however, that at least
where there are monetary payoffs, liquidity is critical in determining the price discovery
contribution of the new market.
7Snowberg et al (2008)
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Chapter 3
Evidence of In-Play Insider Trading
on a U.K. Betting Exchange
Abstract
An open question in market microstructure is whether ‘informed’ traders have an ad-
vantage due to access to private, inside, information; or due to a superior ability to
process public information. In this chapter we attempt to answer this question with
data from a sports betting exchange taken during play. Uniquely, this allows us to
time-stamp information events to the nearest second, and to ensure we are observing
all relevant information regarding the value of an asset. We find evidence of inside in-
formation but not of a superior ability to process public information. The first finding
suggests that a subset of the betting population are observing the action before the
wider public (possibly due to delays in the television signal), and betting using this
informational advantage.
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3.1 Introduction
There is a rich history of empirical betting market studies to explore financial market
theories. In particular, betting markets have proved a popular setting for tests of
market efficiency, and interest has focused on a persistent anomaly: the favourite/long-
shot bias, where returns on favourites exceed those on long-shots.1 In this chapter we
use betting market data to test two hypotheses from market microstructure.
The initial motivation for market microstructure research was a realisation that
Walrasian equilibrium was a poor characterisation of the type of trade carried out on
major stock exchanges.2 In a continuous time trading environment an intermediary
is either contracted to, or can extract profits from, the provision of liquidity. The
costs of this intermediation distort the quoted bid and ask prices from the asset’s
fundamental value. Analysis of the formation of price, which had previously focused
on the fundamentals of the asset, now needed to include the payoffs and preferences of
the intermediary.
In the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, the specialist market-maker trades an
asset with a population composed of informed traders, who have private, inside, infor-
mation on the fundamental value of the asset, and liquidity traders, who trade randomly.
A bid-ask spread is charged in order to offset losses to the informed with gains from
liquidity traders. This is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. Ex-
trapolating this result, if a subset of the trading population has private information
on the contents of a forthcoming public announcement, then the bid-ask spread will
increase prior to, and during, the announcement.
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) endogenise the acquisition of private information by
adding a trading group which processes information. Their information advantage ma-
1The first observation of the bias, in Griffith (1949), predated the market efficiency literature.
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2008) survey the technical explanations of the bias. For a more general
survey of market efficiency in betting markets see Vaughan Williams (2005).
2Garman (1976) was the author to coin the term ‘market microstructure’. For a review of the market
microstructure literature see O’Hara (1995), Madhavan (2000), Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005) and,
for empirical work, Hasbrouck (2007).
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terialises after information on the asset is publicly announced, as they are able to create
private information via their analysis. The specialist market-maker will therefore in-
crease the bid-ask spread after a public announcement to offset losses to the information
processors. This model interestingly proposes that information disclosure can increase,
rather than limit, adverse selection if the signal received from information is noisy.
In the context of information arrival, the two models lead to the following non-
competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread arises due to
asymmetric information prior to, and during, public information arrival.
Hypothesis 2. The adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread arises due to
asymmetric abilities to process symmetric information after public information arrival.
A number of authors have examined the bid-ask spread in financial markets around
significant information events in order to distinguish between the two hypotheses. Lee,
Mucklow and Ready (1993) find that spreads widen both before and after earnings
announcements, although the effect after an announcement is short-lived. Krinsky and
Lee (1996) decompose the bid-ask spread into its adverse selection, transaction cost,
and inventory-control components, and find that the adverse selection component of the
bid-ask spread increases both prior to and after an earnings announcement. Gajewski
(1999), in a study of earnings announcements on the Bourse de Paris, finds greater
support for Hypothesis 2.
In our study we examine bid-ask spreads on a betting exchange, both before a
sporting event, when information arrival is infrequent, and during an event, when in-
formation arrival is highly frequent. The advantage of such a setting is that information
arrival can be time-stamped to the nearest second. Previously, information arrival in
this context was identified only to the nearest minute (see Gajewski (1999)). In addi-
tion, while the announcement of information in a financial market does not preclude
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the prior existence, or subsequent arrival, of private information not observed by the
public, in a sporting environment, once play has begun, all information relevant to the
value of a betting asset is observable. This allows us to correctly isolate the effects
of information arrival. A final advantage lies in the fact that betting market assets
have a reasonable probability of default. The importance of new information for the
value of a betting asset is greater than new information in a financial market, where
the probabilility of default, regardless of the information content, is minimal. Adverse
selection in a betting market should therefore be more pronounced.
The betting price data we use in this chapter is taken from a tennis match. Tennis
is chosen because information events are of sufficient length and can be foreseen. For
example, a tie-break is often important in determining the outcome of a match and
takes place over a sufficient period of time for bettors to realise the importance of the
play whilst it occurs.3 In contrast, a goal is important in determining the outcome of
a football match but is short-lived and cannot necessarily be foreseen. In our study,
information periods are separated into four, with a low information period prior to
play and during rain breaks; an intermediate information period whilst the match is in
play; a high information period during tie-breaks; and a post-high information period
immediately following a tie-break. We find that the adverse selection component of
the bid-ask spread increases during our high information period, but decreases, even
relative to our intermediate information period, immediately after the high information
period. This lends support to Hypothesis 1, but not Hypothesis 2.
This brings us to the question of the nature of inside information on a betting
market. Prior to play this could take the form of information on the wellbeing, fitness or
determination of the athlete. Once the match has begun, such information is typically
revealed to the public in the early stages of play. However, we observe that inside
information increases during a match, and, further, appears to spike during moments
of importance, such as tie-breaks. In other words, inside information is being created
during a match. We therefore propose that informed bettors derive their advantage
3A tie-break is played at the end of a set if the players are tied on 6 games each. The winner of the
tie-break wins the set.
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from observing the action before the rest of the public. Television pictures typically
transmit with a few seconds delay and therefore bettors with a faster transmission, or
present at the game, are able to trade on an informational advantage.4 To capitalise
on this fleeting advantage, bettors would need to feed this information into a computer
and initiate bets via an algorithm. In these circumstances, a high frequency trading
strategy (trading after each point, for example) would generate significant returns.
The chapter is set out as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the data and present
some descriptive statistics. In Section 3.3 we outline the methodology and provide
results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Data
The focus of our betting study is the Men’s 2008 Wimbledon Tennis Final, between
Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal. Described afterwards as ‘one of the greatest finals of
a grand-slam tournament’ (The Times, July 8th 2008), this match attracted a lot of
attention as it pitted the number one ranked player in the world (Federer) against the
number two (Nadal), in the most prestigious of the grand-slam events. As an indication
of the betting interest, Betfair, a betting exchange, matched GBP 28,334,894 on Nadal
to win and GBP 20,802,434 on Federer to win.
We obtained Betfair betting price data for this match from Fracsoft, a company
contracted to market historical pricing data for Betfair. The data available includes
the quoted odds and respective volumes for each player to win, for 211 minutes and
48 seconds before the match begins, and also the 400 minutes and 44 seconds from the
beginning of the match until the end. This gives us 36752 seconds of pricing data for
this match. The match itself lasted for 4 hours and 48 minutes but there were two rain
delays, during which betting could continue. Bets on an exchange can be traded in
the form of a back bet (where the bettor receives the stake plus the odds if the event
occurs), or a lay bet (where a bettor receives the stake if the event does not occur but is
4As we discuss in section 3.3, the betting exchange in question does take steps to limit this advan-
tage.
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liable for the odds if it does occur). From these quoted odds we calculated the back-lay
(bid-ask) spread.
As well as a bet on a player to win, bets were traded on the score, in sets, by which
a player would win. We used this data to identify the timing of tie-breaks. After a set
ends (after a tie-break, for example) and a particular set score is no longer possible,
bets cease to be traded. This allowed us to time-stamp the end of the tie-break. We
then calculated the length of the tie-break with video footage of the match. As a
result we were able to identify the low information periods (prior to play or during a
rain break), the intermediate information periods (during play including tie-breaks),
the high information periods (during a tie-break), and finally the post-high information
periods (immediately following a tie break).5
As well as this match we carried out similar analysis on three matches at an earlier
stage of this tournament. In these cases we did not have video footage, and so estimated
the duration of tie-breaks as 5 minutes. Our statistical results for these matches were
similar to those we report here, but because we were not able to cross-check the data
with video footage, we limit the results we report to the 2008 Final.
This best of five set match finished 3 sets to 2 to Nadal. The 3rd and 4th sets
both went to a tie-break, with Federer winning both to stay in the match. The high
information period consists of the 3rd set tie-break, which lasted 456 seconds, and the
4th set tie-break, which lasted 816 seconds. The post-high information period is defined
in our study as the 5 minutes (300 seconds) that immediately follow each of those
tie-breaks.6
The criteria of a relevant betting asset for our study is as follows. The asset must
have been traded during at least two periods which qualify as high information periods
and two periods which qualify as post-high information periods. By this criteria, we
5There are undoubtedly times, other than during a tie-break, which could be classified as high
information periods. We could also include break-points, set-points and match points. However, these
periods are shorter than tie-breaks which may not give the liquidity providers sufficient time to react
to their existence.
6We also classified the post-high information period as 1 minute following the tie-break and the
results were unaffected.
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analysed 4 bets: Federer to win, Nadal to win, Nadal to win 3-2, and Federer to win
3-2. All other set betting outcomes fell short of that criteria.
Table 3.1 outlines the descriptive statistics for the spreads quoted on the four assets.
Spreads are converted into implied probability form. For example, if a back bet is
quoted at 3-1, then the implied probability is 1/(3 + 1) = 0.25. If the lay bet is quoted
at 4-1, then the implied probability is 1/(4 + 1) = 0.2, which results in a spread of
0.25− 0.2 = 0.05.
More generally, our measure of the bid-ask spread is
S =
1
Ob + 1
−
1
Ol + 1
(3.1)
where Ob is the best back odds offered and Ol is the best lay odds offered.
The average spread is higher, and displays a greater standard deviation, in the
high information period for all four assets. The difference is understandably most
pronounced in assets 3 and 4, the set betting assets, which have the greatest variance
in payoff. The average spread in the post-high information period is lower than the
average spread in the intermediate information period for all four assets. This appears
to suggest that spreads increase around important information arrival, but fall quickly
once information has been revealed. This lends support to the Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) based Hypothesis 1.
As an illustration of the evolution of the bid-ask spread from before play to during
play, consider Figure 3.1. This figure represents the bid-ask spread in asset 1. The
match begins at time 12708 and the bid-ask spread is on average higher and more
volatile after this time. In the next section we present our empirical model.
Information period 1 2 3 4
All 0.0053 (0.0043) 0.0052 (0.0057) 0.0189 (0.0440) 0.0201 (0.0650)
Low 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0032 (0.0000) 0.0053 (0.0011) 0.0055 (0.0013)
Intermediate 0.0061 (0.0051) 0.0062 (0.0068) 0.0261 (0.0530) 0.0278 (0.0793)
High 0.0098 (0.0084) 0.0131 (0.0168) 0.0910 (0.1636) 0.1170 (0.2200)
Post-High 0.0052 (0.0032) 0.0046 (0.0033) 0.0243 (0.0235) 0.0233 (0.0297)
Table 3.1. The mean bid-ask spread (Equation 3.1, to 4 d.p.) for asset 1 (Nadal to win), 2 (Federer to win), 3 (Nadal
to win 3-2) and 4 (Federer to win 3-2) as measured in all, low, intermediate, high and post-high information periods.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Figure 3.1: The bid-ask spread, as defined in Equation (3.1), for asset 1 (Nadal to win).
The match began at Time=12708.
3.3 Methodology and Results
Our aim in this section is to control for the elements of the bid-ask spread which could
be ascribed to transaction costs, inventory-control effects, or a lack of competition in
liquidity provision, and therefore isolate the adverse selection component. In addition,
we need to control for autocorrelation in the spreads as the spreads at nearby time
periods are not independent.
To test our two hypotheses we considered the following regression model for each of
the four assets.
St = β0 + β1St−1 + β2Vt + β3Dt + β4Bt + β5Pt + t (3.2)
At time t, St is the spread as defined in equation (3.1), St−1 is the spread at the
previous time point, Vt is the sum of the volume available at the best three back
and lay odds, and Dt, Bt and Pt are indicator variables, determining if t is during a
intermediate period (during the match), a high information period (during a tie-break)
or a post-high information period (in the 300 seconds following a tie break) respectively.
β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 are fixed coefficients and t is an error term.
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We include the spread at the previous time point to control for temporal dependen-
cies between spreads, and a measure of volume to control for illiquidity which can cause
spreads to widen irrespective of adverse selection. We also expect that our measure of
volume controls for inventory-control effects, as the impact of a liquidity provider’s
inventory considerations would be limited in a liquid market.7
In this model β0 has an economic interpretation. This is the component of the
bid-ask spread which arises regardless of the informational considerations. This is a
positive fixed transaction cost to cover the labour and computing resources involved
in providing liquidity. We also require that β2 < 0 as the bid-ask spread increases as
competition, proxied by volume, decreases.
By Hypothesis 1, we expect that β3 > 0 and β4 > 0. When information is arriving,
the liquidity providers should increase the bid-ask spread to guard against those with
prior access to this information. For Hypothesis 2, we require that β5 > 0. That is,
the bid-ask spread is increased immediately after an important information event as
a subset of the betting population has superior abilities to process this information
and assess the fundamental value of the traded bet. In addition, Hypothesis 2 requires
β3 > 0 as those with superior analytical abilities can put them to work on smaller
information events.
Table 3.2 reports our results for the estimation of Equation (3.2). Diagnostic plots
suggest the model assumptions are valid. In what follows, ‘significant’ indicates sig-
nificance at the 5% level and ‘highly significant’ indicates significance at the 1% level.
β0 > 0 for all four assets and highly significant in three of them, and β2 < 0 for all four
assets and highly significant in three of them. As our rationale outlined above, there
is evidence of a fixed transaction cost component of the bid-ask spread, and that the
bid-ask spread decreases as volume increases.
7The inventory-control literature largely assumes that liquidity is provided by a contracted specialist
who is obligated to provide liquidity continuously (see Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980)
and O’Hara and Oldfield (1986)). When the liquidity provider does not have an obligation to trade
continuously, as would be the case with a betting limit order trader, they can maintain a desired
exposure to the event by placing market orders. In addition, the effect of inventory on price is transient
and, particularly in a liquid market, should therefore be negligible.
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We find that β3 > 0, and significant, for all four assets. This concurs with our
assumption that the arrival of information creates an adverse selection problem for
those providing liquidity. Whether that adverse selection problem is due to inside
information or the ability of certain bettors to process public information is answered
by β4 and β5. We find that β4 is positive and significant for all four assets. In other
words, liquidity providers increase the bid-ask spread during significant information
events due to asymmetric information at these times. This lends support to Hypothesis
1.
On the other hand, we find little support for Hypothesis 2. β5 < 0 for all four assets
and highly significant for two of them. One possible reason for the negative coefficient
is that adverse selection is present in the periods after information arrival, but is simply
less pronounced than adverse selection during information events. However, we have
controlled for temporal dependencies between spreads by regressing on the spread in the
last time period, and used Newey-West standard errors to account for serial correlation
in spreads. We can be confident, therefore, that the adverse selection component of
the bid-ask spread decreases after a significant information event. However, despite
these efforts, we cannot formally reject Hypothesis 2. It is possible that bettors process
information during tie-breaks (e.g. the implications of the tie-break score changing to
5-2 rather than 4-3), and that this is a contributing factor to a positive β3. However,
it is our proposition that the period immediately following a tie-break is where the
opportunity for information processing is most prominent. As adverse selection is lower
here than during the match as a whole, we can say that we have little evidence to
support Hypothesis 2.
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1 2 3 4
β0 0.001117 0.001318 0.000438 0.001084
(7.82E-05)*** (0.000128)*** (0.000195)* (0.000286)***
β1 0.723595 0.769087 0.930341 0.935464
(0.020057)*** (0.022484)*** (0.029465)*** (0.020452)***
β2 -7.11E-10 -3.13E-09 -1.08E-08 -1.54E-07
(1.18E-10)*** (3.38E-10)*** (9.74E-09) (3.90E-08)***
β3 0.00058 0.000151 0.001131 0.000564
(3.97E-05)*** (2.63E-05)*** (0.000469)* (0.000174)**
β4 0.001067 0.001584 0.004809 0.006035
(0.000181)*** (0.000299)*** (0.001713)** (0.002399)*
β5 -0.000275 -0.000282 -8.34E-05 -3.46E-05
(6.50E-05)*** (9.18E-05)** (0.000274) (0.000428)
Adj.R2 0.571369 0.645658 0.883073 0.887566
N 36762 36762 36762 36762
Table 3.2. The results of the estimation of Equation 3.2 for assets 1 to 4. Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedas-
ticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses and *,**, and *** signals significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels
respectively.
If bettors are trading on the basis of inside information, then the question remains
as to the source of such information. Inside information in a betting market has tradi-
tionally been related to the fitness and determination of the athletes. Once the match
has begun, such information is typically revealed to the public in the early stages of
play. If this type of inside information was carrying over into the match, then we would
expect little variation in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread both
before and during a match. However, we observe, via our β3 and β4 coefficients, that
adverse selection increases during a match, and, further, appears to spike during mo-
ments of importance, such as tie-breaks. In other words, inside information is being
created during a match, and we propose that this inside information accrues to traders
observing the action before the rest of the public.
There is reason to be believe that the pictures viewed on television are delayed
with respect to viewing the action live. For television pictures to be transmitted, the
images must be encoded, processed and then transmitted to the host broadcaster for
further processing. They can then be transmitted to the home audience, or by satellite
to other broadcasters around the world. Although information is not available on the
delay in this particular instance, the delay may be significant even for those watching
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the event in the host country. If a bettor has a mobile device at the game, which would
appear rather inconspicuous amongst the crowd, then information can be relayed to a
computer instructed to trade algorithmically.
It must be acknowledged that our evidence for in-play insider trading is the fact
that liquidity providers take mitigating actions to offset losses to such insiders. It may
be argued that this evidence is circumstantial. Our approach, however, is in good
company. In Shin (1993), the level of insider trading is inferred from the overround
that a bookmaker charges on a series of horse races. The overround is the extent to
which the sum of the implied win probabilities of all the horses exceeds 100%. This
is the margin that the bookmaker claims. This margin, much like the bid-ask spread
charged on a betting exchange, is the action that an intermediary takes to offset losses
to those with private information.
Another issue is that Betfair does attempt to nullify the private information that
accrues to those with a viewing advantage. For in-play markets there is a 1-5 second
window (after a bet is matched) during which a liquidity provider can cancel the offer.8
The length of the window depends on the company’s estimation of the delay in television
transmission. The aim of this window is precisely to deter trading on private information
during a match. Our results, however, suggest that this window is either insufficient to
remove the viewing advantage, or at least is perceived by those providing liquidity to
be insufficient.
Our general results on the nature of informed trading differ slightly from those car-
ried out on financial markets. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), Krinsky and Lee (1996),
and Gajewski (1999) find equal or greater support for Hypothesis 2, as for Hypothesis
1. A possible reason for this may lie in the different environment within which we test.
There may be greater scope for detailed analysis of earnings announcements in a finan-
cial market than there is for the outcome of a tie-break in a tennis match. Although we
would argue that a sophisticated bettor could calculate the conditional probability of
a player winning, given the outcome of the last set, this does not correspond with our
conversations with bookmakers. Although detailed statistical analysis is carried out
8http://help.betfair.com/contents/itemId/i65767339/index.en.html
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prior to a match, in-play pricing is often determined by the bookmaker’s ‘feeling’ on a
game, whilst observing competitor’s pricing to ensure that an arbitrage is not available.
If a bookmaker believes there is little to be gained from detailed statistical analysis,
it is unlikely that those providing liquidity on a betting exchange will feel the need to
guard against other bettors using such analysis.
The task confronting bettors may just be simpler than that confronting a stock
market trader. The odds quoted on a player to win are easily intrepreted as the implied
probability of such an outcome. The efficient value of a stock, on the other hand, is the
present value of all future returns, whether that be dividend payouts or capital gains.
Analysing the effect of a company earnings announcement on such returns is therefore
a complicated task.
A second possible explanation is the relative novelty of in-play betting exchanges.
Although private information has been gathered, and sometimes created, on the out-
come of sporting events for a long period, the possibility of trading in-play has only
emerged in the last decade. As a result, returns from the possession of in-play inside
information may be at an early and bountiful stage, if competition is low. Once the
market develops, and opportunities diminish, it may be that informed bettors will fol-
low financial market professionals and develop an alternative advantage via analytical
techniques.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have set out to answer a fundamental question in market microstruc-
ture: whether ‘informed’ traders derive their advantage from access to inside informa-
tion, or due to a superior ability to process public information. For this purpose we
took data from a sports betting exchange during play. Uniquely, this allowed us to
time-stamp information events to the nearest second, and to ensure we were observing
all relevant information regarding the value of an asset. We found evidence of inside
information but not of a superior ability to process public information. As traditional
types of betting inside information (such as knowledge of the player’s fitness) become
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stale once a match begins, our findings suggest that a subset of the betting population
is creating its own inside information by observing the action before the wider public
(possibly due to delays in the television signal), and betting using this informational
advantage. To capitalise on this fleeting advantage, bettors would need to feed this in-
formation into a computer and initiate bets via an algorithm. In these circumstances, a
high frequency trading strategy (trading after each point, for example) would generate
significant returns.
In the U.K., the speed of television transmission differs substantially between those
channels transmitted terrestrially, and those transmitted by satellite. The terrestrial
transmission is noticeably faster. In 2008, the Wimbledon Final was televised on BBC1
which is available on terrestrial television. Most of the tennis played during the year
however is only available on satellite television. This creates the possibility that the
effect we have observed here may be more pronounced elsewhere.
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Chapter 4
Examining Agency Conflict in
Horse-Racing
Abstract
We study U.K. horse-racing for signs of conflict between horse owners (principals) and
trainers (agents). Trainers often prepare their own horses for races, in addition to hav-
ing outsiders’ horses in their care. Utilising betting market data to infer the expected
performance of a horse, we find that owner-trainer horses outperform outsider-trainer
horses, indicating that this principal-agent relationship is characterised by agent shirk-
ing. If the owner holds a large proportion of the horses in the trainer’s stable, the
shirking effect is mitigated, but not eradicated. In a separate result, we find that
outsider-trainer horses are more inconsistent than their owner-trainer peers. As incon-
sistency is a sign of betting market manipulation, this suggests that the agent in this
setting extracts a second, informational, rent from the principal.
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4.1 Introduction
We employ agents to undertake a number of frequent tasks on our behalf. Agents are
entrusted to find us a job, manage our investments, and school our children. As the
effort and performance of agents is imperfectly observed, this creates ample opportu-
nities for conflict, and often welfare losses for the principal. For example, Rutherford
et al (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) find that estate agents sell their client’s
houses for less than their own houses, after controlling for observable house character-
istics. Similarly, Ang et al (2000) find that managers who have little stake in a small
firm spend more on expenses and run the firm less efficiently than firms with a single
owner-manager. The economic study of agency conflict dates back at least as far as
Smith (1776), who analysed conflict in sharecropping, where a landowner allows a ten-
ant to farm their land in return for a cut of their crop. A more formal treatment of
principal-agent issues is provided by Laffont and Martimont (2001).
In this chapter we examine agency conflict in horse-racing. Race-horse trainers
are responsible for the welfare of horses in their stable, supervising how the animal
is fed, how hard the horse is run prior to a race, and often deciding in which races
the horse will run. Many trainers (agents) divide their time between the preparation
of their own horses and those of outsiders (principals). While the trainer receives all
of the win purse if their horse is successful, they receive only a fraction (typically
10%1) for training an outsider’s horse to victory. In addition, and crucially for any
study of agency conflict, much of the trainer’s effort is unobservable; moreover the
asymmetric information problem is exacerbated by there being an animal at the centre
of the conflict. To illustrate the opacity of the trainer’s actions, Fox (2005) likens the
race-horse trainer to a tribal shaman, or witch-doctor, whose success is ascribed to
impressive work, and whose failure is due to factors outside of their control.
There are a number of elements to horse-racing that make it an interesting arena
1Boyle et al (2007) indicates that 10% is the typical commission the trainer can earn but Scott
(1968) suggests the commission can be as much as 50% if the owner wishes to align the trainer’s
incentives with their own.
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for the study of agency conflict. Firstly, in contrast to the infrequent sale of a house,
horses run on a regular basis over the course of their careers, yielding a large sample
of performance data. We use data on every horse-race in the U.K. between 2005 and
2010. Secondly, the interaction of horse trainer and owner is dynamic, as the owner can
withdraw a horse from a trainer’s stable if performance is deemed unsatisfactory; the
estate agent is unlikely to fret to the same degree over repeat business from a house-
seller. Thirdly, there is no need to infer the intrinsic ability of a horse from its observable
characteristics; there is a betting market from which to gauge the pre-race expected
performance of a horse. Finally, the horse owner is relatively empowered compared to
the owner of a small firm; whereas removing a firm manager can be problematic and
time-consuming, the horse can often be removed from a trainer’s stable on short notice
and without compensation.
Utilising betting market data to infer the expected performance of a horse, we
find that owner-trainer horses outperform when compared with outsider-trainer horses.
This suggests that this particular agency conflict is characterised by the agent shirking.
Alternatively, it is plausible that trainers - who undoubtedly possess private information
on the racing game - are better able to identify the good horses unappreciated by the
betting public. To control for this, we examine the performance of older, higher-class,
horses for which the private information set should be smaller. As in the broader study,
owner-trainer horses outperform outsider-trainer horses in this subset of animals.
One way in which an owner can mitigate the shirking effect is to entrust the prepa-
ration of a number of horses to the same trainer. This way the trainer should be careful
not to disappoint the owner for fear of losing a substantial proportion of their stable
and livelihood. We calculate the dominance of a trainer’s stable by each owner, and
find that owning a large proportion of the horses under a trainer’s care can mitigate,
but not eradicate, the shirking effect.
In horse-racing there is potentially a second source of income besides the prize
money. If trainers, or owners, have private information on the upcoming performance
of a horse, they can bet for profit; indeed, in the U.K. it is legal for them to do so.
Trainers have the potential to create such private information, as they control the
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preparation of horses in their care. One sign of manipulation of horse performance for
betting market gain is inconsistency; initiating a poor performance by the horse one
week - thereby causing the betting public to downgrade their estimate of the horse’s
ability - only for the horse to outperform relative to the betting market’s downgraded
expectations the next week, when in fact the horse was simply performing at its true
level in the second race.
We examine whether such performance manipulation is a second, informational,
source of agency conflict. After controlling for other factors that affect the consistency
of performance, we find that horses trained by an outsider are more inconsistent than
horses trained by their owner. This suggests that trainers not only exert less effort
when training an outsider’s horse, but also, on average, exploit these horses for betting
market gain. These results give empirical weight to anecdotal evidence that horse-racing
is at least partially manipulated, and that the trainer - with their privileged access to
information - is front and centre in this manipulation.2
The evidence of performance manipulation in horse-racing also corresponds with
evidence of betting market-induced corruption in other sports. For example, Wolfers
(2006) finds evidence of point-shaving - where a heavily-favoured team wins but fails to
beat the bookmaker’s spread - in college and professional basketball. Borghesi (2008)
and Bernhardt and Heston (2010) suggest that such indirect studies of corruption, which
rely on subtle inferences, should test an alternative hypothesis to ensure the robustness
of the result.
In our case, an alternative explanation for the greater consistency of owner-trainer
horses is that the trainer - with their superior knowledge of racing - is able to select
the most consistent horses. If the trainer does have private information, it is much
more likely to be related to younger, lower-profile, horses. This explanation can be
discounted, however, because the inconsistency of outsider-trainer horses is apparent
even after controlling for the class in which a horse runs, and its age.
2Scott (1968), in an anthropological study of a U.S. racetrack, details how widespread performance
manipulation is, and the central role trainers play in this due to their informational advantage over
other actors.
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A recent paper by Boyle et al (2007) examines horse-racing results data from New
Zealand to search for conflict between horse owners and trainers. On average, they find
that the performance of horses is unaffected by the owner trainer relationship, though
horses trained in small stables do show some signs of agency-induced underperformance.
Their study differs from ours in that betting market data is not used to infer a horse’s
expected performance, nor do the authors consider the possibility that the trainer’s
manipulation of the performance of outsiders’ horses - and the resultant opportunity
for profitable betting - may be a second source of agency conflict.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data
set, and how the expected performance of a horse is inferred. Section 5.3 contains the
empirical analysis of horse performance and consistency, and Section 5.4 concludes.
4.2 Data
We collected data on every horse race run in the U.K. between 1st January 2005 and
31st December 2010 inclusive, from Betwise, a betting information company. After
discarding data on races without a designated class - which is an important control
variable for our later analysis - we were left with 559,383 horse-level performance ob-
servations. The race data includes the date of the meeting, the type of race (e.g. flat,
national hunt), the distance over which the race is run, the handicap system, the class
of the race (which ranges from 1 to 7), and the win prize money (which ranges from
GBP 0 to GBP 1,000,000). Summary statistics on horse and race characteristics can
be found in Table 5.1.
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All (N=559383) Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Age 4.95 4 22 2 2.33 0.84 3.28
Starting Price (Odds) 22.6 13 501 1.02 29.2 3.64 24.32
Class 4.41 5 7 1 1.41 -0.71 3.09
Distance (000’s of yards) 2.72 2.2 7.92 1.1 1.4 0.66 2.27
No. of Horses in Race 11.53 11 40 2 3.74 0.89 6.16
Win Prize Money (000’s of GBP) 12.65 5.24 1000 0 38 13.83 275.4
Owner = Trainer (N=65861) Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Age 6 6 16 2 2.61 0.54 2.72
Class 4.78 5 7 1 1.19 -0.67 3.69
Distance (000’s of yards) 3.1 3.52 7.92 1.1 1.47 0.18 1.79
No. of Horses 11.49 12 40 2 3.39 0.44 4.33
Win Prize Money (000’s of GBP) 7.11 4.5 1000 0 18.14 25.03 1007.46
Starting Price (Odds) 30.7 17 501 1.17 37.27 2.99 16.85
Owner 6= Trainer (N=493522) Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Age 4.8 4 22 2 2.25 0.87 3.34
Class 4.36 5 7 1 1.42 -0.69 2.99
Distance (000’s of yards) 2.67 2.2 7.92 1.1 1.39 0.73 2.4
No. of Horses 11.54 11 40 2 3.78 0.93 6.29
Win Prize Money (000’s of GBP) 13.39 5.44 1000 0 39.86 13.23 251.47
Starting Price (Odds) 21.52 12 501 1.02 27.78 3.74 25.74
Table 5.1. Summary statistics for horse and race characteristics for all U.K. races between 1st January
2005 and 31st December 2010. The full sample is described in the top panel, with the owner = trainer
sub-sample in the middle panel, and the owner 6= trainer sub-sample in the bottom panel.
For each horse we have their age, and the identity of their owner and trainer at the
time of the race. There are 55,763 unique horses in our sample, with 27,861 unique
owners and 2,944 unique trainers. To determine whether the owner was also the trainer
of the horse, we took the surname of the trainer, then ran a regular expression to test
whether any sequential part of the owner name was an exact match on the trainer
surname. If it was, our owner=trainer dummy variable equals 1, and 0 otherwise. This
algorithm captures, at least in part, the frequent occurrence of a trainer registering a
horse they own in their wife’s name.3 By this method, 65,861 horse-level performances
are given by horses where the owner is the trainer, with the remaining 493,522 per-
formances given by horses where the owner is not the trainer. Summary statistics on
3To ensure that our results are not driven by common names (e.g. Smith, Brown), we also altered
the algorithm so that only owners and trainers with an exact match (i.e. A Brown) were classified as
one individual. Our results were unaffected.
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these two sub-samples are also in Table 5.1. On average, owner-trainer horses are older,
compete in higher class races (but for less prize money), and are quoted longer odds,
than outsider-trainer horses. However, these differences are relatively small, and are
taken into account in the multivariate analysis in Section 5.3.
We are also interested in the extent to which an owner dominates a trainer’s stable.
This is calculated by counting the number of horses in a trainer’s stable in any year and
defining our owner dominance variable as the proportion (between 0 and 1) of these
horses which the owner in question holds. For example, suppose a trainer had 10 horses,
of which 2 were his own and 8 belonged to one other individual. For the trainer’s two
horses we would have the owner=trainer dummy equal to 1, and the owner dominance
variable equal to 0.2. For the remaining 8 horses, the owner=trainer dummy would
be 0, with the owner dominance variable equal to 0.8. The expectation is that the
outsider-owner can offset part of the agency costs by holding a large proportion of the
remaining horses under the same trainer’s supervision.
In order to infer the expected performance of each horse, we collected the Starting
Price, which is a summary measure of the odds quoted by British bookmakers at the
time the race began. From here we can infer a predicted finishing position in the race
for each horse. For example, a horse with odds of 2-1 (GBP 2 returned for every GBP
1 staked, if the horse wins) can be expected to finish above a horse with odds of 4-1.4
We then compared the predicted finishing position of each horse with their actual
finishing position. All horses which failed to finish a race were classified as finishing
last. We then used the actual and predicted finishing positions, and number of horses
in the race, to construct a measure of horse performance:
RelativePerformance =
PredictedF inish− ActualF inish
NumberofHorses
(4.1)
4There is the possibility of errors in this estimation of predicted finishing position. For example,
consider a temperamental horse, who will either win or fail to finish. This horse may be expected to
finish behind a slower, more consistent, horse but the win odds will not capture this. Nevertheless, in
the absence of place (top 2/3 finish) odds, the win odds are a good proxy for the predicted finishing
position.
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Relative performance has a mean of -0.0266, a median of 0, a minimum of -0.97 and
a maximum of 0.96. The standard deviation is 0.3084, with skewness of -0.145 and
kurtosis of 0.1980. The measure is negatively skewed because non-finishing horses are
classified as having finished last. If there is more than one horse that fails to finish, the
average relative performance is less than 0. If no more than one horse fails to finish,
the average for that race is 0.
In order to infer the consistency of the horse, we are also interested in the absolute
value of relative performance:
AbsoluteRelativePerformance = |
PredictedF inish− ActualF inish
NumberofHorses
| (4.2)
This measure treats a horse that outperforms exactly the same as a horse that
underperforms. Suppose a horse runs in a 8-horse race. The horse is tipped to finish 1st
but instead finishes 5th. This leads to a absolute relative performance observation of 0.5.
If another horse is predicted to finish 5th but actually finishes 1st, the absolute relative
performance observation would also be equal to 0.5. The aim of this measure is to
capture instances when the trainer, or owner, could have profited from the performance
of the horse, either due to under-performance or out-performance. A bettor can indeed
now profit from under-performance as betting exchanges (such as Betfair in the U.K.)
facilitate betting against a horse. Further, the potential payoff to the bettor increases
in the degree of under-performance/out-performance.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
In the first part of this section we are interested in the effect that the separation of
ownership and management (training) in horse-racing has on performance. Further,
we examine the extent to which an outsider-owner can mitigate the agency problem
by placing a number of horses with the same trainer, thereby increasing the trainer’s
dependence on the owner.
In Table 5.2, we display the results of a regression of our relative performance mea-
sure on the owner=trainer dummy and the owner dominance variable for the full 6 year
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sample. The intercept term is negative, due to the negative skew in relative performance.
More importantly, we observe that owner-trainer horses outperform outsider-trainer
horses at the 0.1% significance level. As the average race is between 11.53 horses (see
Table 5.1), the coefficient in regression 1, Table 5.2 implies that owner-trainer horses, on
average, outperform outsider-trainer horses by 0.35 places. This agency-induced prob-
lem can be mitigated by an owner’s dominance of a trainer’s stable, as this coefficient
is positive and significant at the 0.1% level. However, examining the coefficients of the
model, we can see that an owner who completely dominated an outsider-trainer’s stable
could not expect to completely avoid agency costs in the form of underperformance.
We ran supplementary regressions using fixed effects - also displayed in Table 5.2
- estimated using the White method to allow for clustering of errors at the handicap-
type, horse, trainer, owner, race-type, and race level. The fixed effects for handicap-
type, horse, race-type, and race have little effect on the remaining coefficients. On the
other hand, the trainer fixed effect, captured in Regression 4, serves to reduce, but not
eliminate, the coefficient associated with the owner=trainer dummy, and reverse the
coefficient associated with owner dominance. We conjecture that this implies that most
of the agent shirking is concentrated with a number of ‘bad-egg’ trainers. Similarly,
the coefficients are reduced when owner fixed effects are incorporated, suggesting that
a number of ‘naive’ owners are being disproportionately hit by agency costs. In race
terms, owner-trainer horses outperform outsider-trainer horses by only 0.07 places once
trainer fixed-effects are incorporated, and only 0.15 places when owner fixed-effects are
incorporated.
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Dep.Variable: Relative Performance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intercept -0.032284 -0.033817 -0.032298 -0.02598 -0.029335 -0.033429 -0.034754
(0.000478)*** (0.002876)*** (0.027893) (0.002201) (0.014377)* (0.000546)*** (0.038014)
Owner=Trainer Dummy 0.030231 0.034705 0.035163 0.006956 0.012966 0.03283 0.038689
(0.001432)*** (0.001682)*** (0.011492)** (0.001642)*** (0.006780). (0.001434)*** (0.010001)***
Owner Dominance 0.016303 0.024165 0.011872 -0.011473 0.009124 0.022859 0.027831
(0.002120)*** (0.002137)*** (0.017179) (0.004134)** (0.010253) (0.002125)*** (0.003555)***
Incl. Handicap Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No
Incl. Horse Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No No
Incl. Trainer Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No
Incl. Owner Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No No
Incl. Race-Type Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No
Incl. Race Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
R2 0.001474 0.00486 0.115379 0.033707 0.074864 0.003844 0.01327
No. of Observations 559383 559383 559383 559383 559383 559383 559383
Table 5.2. Coefficient estimates when relative performance was regressed on an owner-trainer dummy variable (equalling one when the owner is also the
trainer) and owner dominance (between 0 and 1, equalling 1 when the horse owner holds all horses in a trainer’s stable). Regression 1 is pooled, while
regressions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 incorporate handicap-type, horse, trainer, owner, race-type, and race fixed effects respectively. White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors - including allowances for clustering of errors in fixed effects - are in parentheses. ***,**,*, and . indicates significance at the
0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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One plausible explanation for the significance of the owner=trainer dummy is that
trainers have private information on horses and therefore buy horses which will, on
average, outperform relative to betting market expectations. To control for this we
re-run the first regression, this time sampling only horses running in races of class 5 or
over, and of age 5 or over. Older, higher-grade, horses are more likely to be well-known
by the betting public, and therefore the amount of private information, on which the
trainer can capitalise, is likely to be less. This choice of class and age removes around
half of the sample in each case. As shown in Table 5.3, the owner=trainer dummy and
the owner dominance variable are still positive and significant determinants of horse
performance for these two subsamples at the 0.1% level.
Another concern may be that the focus on horse-level performances is dominated by
horses than run often, and stables that contain a large number of horses. To a certain
extent this is controlled for by the horse and trainer fixed effects, but in regression 4
of Table 5.3 we consider only horses that are part of a stable of 149 horses or less,
and in regression 5 we consider only horses that ran in 18 races or less during our
sample period. Again, both sub-samples comprise approximately half of the full sample
size. The owner-trainer effect is still present in these two sub-samples - highlighting the
robustness of this result - but the dominance of a trainer’s stable, by an owner, is not
a significant factor amongst horses that run less frequently. A possible explanation is
that a horse which runs infrequently - perhaps because of injuries - is of less importance
to both the trainer and the owner.
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Dep.Variable: Relative Performance
1 2 3 4 5
All Class ≥ 5 Age ≥ 5 Stable Size ≤ 149 No. of Runs ≤ 18
Intercept -0.032284 -0.029741 -0.040987 -0.003882 -0.045664
(0.000478)*** (0.000640)*** (0.000714)*** (0.000691)*** (0.000651)***
Owner=Trainer Dummy 0.030231 0.019395 0.027539 0.009799 0.038783
(0.001432)*** (0.001788)*** (0.001944)*** (0.001763)*** (0.001951)***
Owner Dominance 0.016303 0.029409 0.035887 0.018473 0.000528
(0.002120)*** (0.002895)*** (0.002829)*** (0.002564)*** (0.002735)
Incl. Handicap Fixed Effects No No No No No
Incl. Horse Fixed Effects No No No No No
Incl. Trainer Fixed Effects No No No No No
Incl. Owner Fixed Effects No No No No No
Incl. Race-Type Fixed Effects No No No No No
R2 0.001474 0.001351 0.002749 0.000633 0.001662
No. of Observations 559383 298191 277838 284561 290550
Table 5.3. Coefficient estimates when relative performance was regressed on an owner-trainer dummy variable (equalling one when the owner is also the
trainer) and owner dominance (between 0 and 1, equalling 1 when the horse owner holds all horses in a trainer’s stable). Regression 1 is pooled, regression
2 considers only horses when run in races of Class 5 or over, regression 3 considers only horses aged 5 and over, regression 4 considers only horses in
a trainer’s stable of less than or equal to 149 horses, and regression 5 considers only horses that ran 18 times or less over the sample period. White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Our second search for agency conflict focuses on the consistency of horses. A horse
can be inconsistent due to age, the class of the race, the distance over which they run,
the prize money on offer and also the number of horses in a race. In particular, we
expect that horses running in higher class races, with greater prize money, should be
more consistent. Boyle (2008) and Johnson et al (2010) find that high-class races finish
closer to betting market expectations than low-grade races. This could be due to the
greater inherent consistency of better horses, or due to the greater monetary incentives
for maximum effort at the higher-grade races. These monetary incentives should also
result in a negative relationship between absolute relative performance and win prize
money. In addition, we believe that races run with a greater number of horses should
be less predictable - yielding larger absolute relative performance measures - as there is
greater potential for collisions and for a horse to be impeded. Finally, we are a priori
unsure of the relationship between the distance of the race, and the age of the horse on
absolute relative performance.
In an opaque environment where the horse’s true ability is difficult to observe,
inconsistency can also be a sign of betting market manipulation. A poor performance
one week can lead the betting market to downgrade their estimate of the horse’s ability,
driving up the odds, and potential returns to betting, the next race the horse runs. We
assess whether, after controlling for observable determinants of inconsistency, outsider-
trainer horses are more inconsistent than owner-trainer horses. If so, this suggests the
existence of a second, informational form of agency conflict.
We regress the absolute relative performance measure on the owner=trainer dummy
and the owner dominance variable, with results displayed in Table 5.4. Reassuringly,
we find that the control variables instituted have, in the main, the expected impact on
absolute relative performance. Specifically, absolute relative performance is decreasing
in win prize money (except in one specification) and the class of the race, and increasing
in the number of horses in the race. In the focus of our study, we find that outsider-
trainer horses are more inconsistent, as absolute relative performance is lower when
the owner is also the trainer. This result is robust to the introduction handicap-type,
horse, trainer and owner fixed effects. The introduction of trainer fixed effects reduces
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the coefficient associated with the owner-trainer dummy, again suggesting that any
manipulation of horse performance is concentrated with a number of ‘bad-egg’ trainers.
It is less clear, however, that this conflict can be mitigated by the owner dominating
a trainer’s stable. The coefficient associated with this variable is not negative in all
cases. It is perhaps surprising that outsider-owners can limit the shirking of trainers
by placing a number of horses in the same stable, but appear less able to deter the
manipulation of horse performance for betting purposes with the same policy.
A natural next step would be to develop a betting strategy that capitalises on the
results outlined in this paper. This has not proved feasible for two reasons. Firstly,
the over-round (the extent to which the sum of implied win probabilities quoted by a
bookmaker exceeds 1) renders most strategies unprofitable, even if they increase returns
above the blanket strategy of betting on all horses. A second reason - more closely
associated with the betting market manipulation outlined in the paper - is that any
trainer manipulating the performance of horses would, by necessity, attempt to disguise
their actions. A horse may be deliberately under-performed for a number of races until
the odds on a win have lengthened sufficiently for the trainer to push them for a win.
Alternatively, the advent of betting exchanges - where bettors can wager on a horse
to lose - could mean that the payoff is actually reaped when the horse underperforms.
Therefore, while (unnecessary) inconsistency indicates betting market manipulation, it
does not lead us to a profitable strategy.
There are two other issues that warrant discussion. The first is the role of the
jockey; specifically whether the jockey would be in a position to manipulate horse races
without the consent of the trainer. The jockey would be responsible for implementing
the parts of performance manipulation that the trainer does not control (i.e. in the race
itself), but it is unlikely that the jockey can manipulate horse performance without the
trainer’s knowledge. A jockey does not have a significant informational advantage over
the trainer, who, after all, is in charge of all elements of the preparation of the horse
for races.
A second issue is that, under certain circumstances, it may also be in the interests of
trainers to manipulate the performance of their own horses. For this to occur, however,
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we would require the prize money to be very small compared to the potential betting
income. As trainers receive only a percentage of any prize money, it must be optimal
for the trainer to manipulate horse performance if it is optimal for the owner to do so,
but it is not necessarily optimal for the owner to engage in manipulation if it optimal
for the trainer to do so. Therefore, a trainer with both their own horses and those of
outsiders in their care will first find it optimal to manipulate the performance of the
outsiders’ horses.
It should be noted that there are similarities between the trainer’s situation - where
the betting market provides insurance against poor horse performance - and that of a
CEO who is paid in stocks and stock options but is allowed to hedge their exposure to
the firm’s cash flows. Bettis et al (2001) document that, in their sample, firm insiders
use derivatives to reduce their stake in the firm by 25%, on average. A New York
Times article (Eric Dash, Feb 5th 2001) describes such practices by Goldman Sachs
staff. Theoretical analysis of this conundrum is provided by Gao (2010), who shows that
firms will increase the sensitivity of CEO pay to performance (i.e. weight compensation
further toward bonuses rather than base salary) to offset the effect that hedging has
in reducing the CEO’s exposure to firm value. Should data on the various incentive
contracts in horse-racing become available, it would be instructive to identify whether
the win commission paid to trainers is higher in high/low class races, or wherever the
opportunity to hide hedging transactions (i.e. bet against the horse) is greater.
Another avenue for further work is to investigate the effect of career concerns on
the performance of a trainer’s horse. Gibbs and Murphy (1992) illustrate that older
managers derive less motivation from implicit incentives such as career concerns, and
therefore require greater explicit (pay) incentives in order to exert effort. The addition
of data on the trainer’s age may shed light on why, on average, implicit incentives are not
sufficient to alleviate the agency problems described in this chapter. For example, the
agency effects may be concentrated with older trainers whereas younger, career-minded
trainers may be less problematic.
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Dep. Var: Absolute Relative Performance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intercept 0.235279 0.201061 0.231978 0.192526 0.183706 0.184213 0.195775
(0.000313)*** (0.001547)*** (0.005208)*** (0.043023)*** (0.003499)*** (0.015061)*** (0.001898)***
Owner=Trainer Dummy -0.003716 -0.005640 -0.003405 -0.006724 -0.002702 -0.007342 -0.00402
(0.000932)*** (0.000942)*** (0.001014)*** (0.002882)* (0.001074)* (0.003758). (0.000939)***
Owner Dominance 0.001981 -0.004603 -0.003833 -0.003120 0.004728 0.00323 -0.004954
(0.001398) (0.001402)** (0.001444)** (0.002806) (0.002211)* (0.002949) (0.001401)***
No. of Horses 0.002389 0.002224 0.002361 0.00244 0.002484 0.003052
(7.56E-05)*** (9.14E-05)*** (0.000140)*** (7.73E-05)*** (8.66E-05)*** (7.81E-05)***
Distance (000’s of yards) 0.002902 1.22E-03 0.008347 0.004543 0.005312 0.004376
(0.000254)*** (0.000480)* (0.002356)*** (0.000390)*** (0.000585)*** (0.000449)***
Class -0.004147 -0.00339 -0.004734 -0.00278 -0.003148 -0.00376
(0.000222)*** (0.000402)*** (0.000477)*** (0.000269)*** (0.000416)*** (0.000234)***
Win Prize Money (000’s of GBP) -0.000025 -1.66E-05 0.000033 -2.19E-05 -1.62E-05 -5.56E-05
(8.39E-06)** (1.47E-05) (9.30E-06)*** (8.93E-06)** (8.82E-06). (8.42E-06)***
Age 0.003729 -0.00198 0.002886 0.004677 0.004514 0.002145
(0.000144)*** (0.000742)** (0.007210) (0.000376)*** (0.001940)* (0.000166)***
Incl. Handicap Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No No
Incl. Horse Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No
Incl. Trainer Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No No
Incl. Owner Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No
Incl. Race-Type Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
R2 0.000028 0.006617 0.024986 0.116652 0.015558 0.064459 0.009586
No. of Observations 559383 559383 559383 559383 559383 559383 559383
Table 5.4. Coefficient estimates when absolute relative performance (a measure of horse inconsistency) was regressed on an owner-trainer dummy variable
(equalling one when the owner is also the trainer) and owner dominance (between 0 and 1, equalling 1 when the horse owner holds all horses in a trainer’s
stable). Regression 1 is pooled, regression 2 is pooled and includes control variables, while regressions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 incorporate handicap-type, horse,
trainer, owner and race-type fixed effects respectively. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors - including allowances for clustering of errors
in fixed effects - are in parentheses. ***,**,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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4.4 Conclusion
We examine horse-racing for signs of conflict between the principal - the horse owner -
and the agent, the trainer entrusted with preparing the horse for racing. We find that
owner-trainer horses outperform outsider-trainer horses, though this effect can, in some
cases, be mitigated by the owner placing a number of horses with the same trainer.
We also find a second agency cost, where outsider-trainer horses are more inconsistent
than owner-trainer horses, suggesting that trainers, on average, use outsider’s horses
for betting market gain.
In race terms, the separation of ownership and management leads to, on average,
under-performance of 0.35 places for a horse trained by an outsider. It is perhaps
surprising that the betting market does not incorporate information on the ownership
of horses and its implications for performance. It is due to this oversight, however, that
we are able to identify the costs that owners bear when delegating management of their
asset to an outsider.
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Chapter 5
A Note on Market Efficiency
Without Noise-Trader Risk
Abstract
It is said that arbitrage is central to the maintenance of an efficient market, where
prices reflect the fundamental value of an asset. When the prices of two equivalent assets
diverge, an arbitrageur will bet on a convergence and collect a risk-free profit. However,
as the limits to arbitrage literature points out, noise traders can drive prices further
from fundamentals, and arbitrageurs may therefore ration the resources they commit.
In this chapter we examine arbitrage opportunities in a betting market where, crucially,
there is no noise-trader risk. We find that two limits to arbitrage remain. First,
transaction costs render a significant proportion of arbitrage opportunities unprofitable.
Second, collateral requirements lend an element of irreversibility to the enactment of an
arbitrage, and therefore mean that a high return must be exacted for the arbitrageur
to exercise their ‘option to arbitrage’. This is the first empirical evidence that collateral
requirements do indeed limit arbitrage. We propose an alteration to the design of this
particular market to remove the two limits, and thereby foster market efficiency.
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5.1 Introduction
It is said that arbitrage is central to the maintenance of an efficient market, where
prices reflect the fundamental value of an asset. When the prices of two equivalent
assets diverge, an arbitrageur will bet on a convergence and collect a risk-free profit.
As these positive returns come without risk, the arbitrageur experiences no frictions in
obtaining capital, and can therefore rectify any market inefficiencies.
In reality, however, there are few risk-free arbitrages. The failure and subsequent
bailout of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a highly leveraged arbitrage firm,
in 1998, demonstrates this vividly. An arbitrageur can lose money, at least in the
short run, and given high leverage and collateral constraints, an arbitrage strategy can
amount to no more than ‘picking up nickels in front of bulldozers.1
The limits to arbitrage literature (see Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for a recent survey)
highlights a number of impediments to the operation of arbitrage. Most prominent of
these is noise-trader, or non-fundamentals, risk. In the model of De Long et al. (1990),
irrational noise traders cause prices to deviate from the fundamental value of an asset.
An arbitrageur is limited in taking an offsetting position as they have a finite horizon,
and the divergence may initially increase, causing them to exit the market at a loss.
In other words, the possibility of losing money in the short-run can deter arbitrageurs
from participating in the market.
This premise is extended to include agency costs in Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In
this model arbitrageurs use investor’s capital to trade. As losing money in the short-
run can cause investors to remove their funding, arbitrageurs may themselves ration the
positions they take, so as not to be left with insufficient funding when a later arbitrage
trade can generate higher returns.2
In this chapter we analyse arbitrage opportunities in a betting market where there
1A description of LTCM trading strategies from a rival money manager (Lowenstein (2001)).
2Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also posit that there is an intellectual limit to arbitrage which prevents
arbitrageurs from crossing markets to rectify market inefficiencies. Duarte et al. (2006) find evidence
of such a limit to arbitrage in fixed income markets. Strategies which require more ‘intellectual capital’
to implement, display returns above the market benchmark after controlling for risk.
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is no noise trader risk. Bets are traded on Betfair, a betting exchange, on the winner
of a tennis match. They are also traded on the score in sets. It is therefore possible
to replicate the bet on a player to win with a series of bets in the set market. An
arbitrageur can, for example, take a long position on a player to win, and take a short
position on all the possible scores in the set market. These markets are short-term
and do not rely on the convergence typically required for financial market arbitrages.
The arbitrageur can lock-in a profit regardless of subsequent moves in the price, and
regardless of the outcome of the match.
To give the greatest possibility that anomalies will arise, we examine arbitrage op-
portunities during matches. We find that arbitrage opportunities are frequent, allow for
significant returns given the time frame, and in some cases persist. One possible reason
for this is that bettors are unable to continuously monitor markets. Hens et al (2006)
show that limited market participation means that arbitrage opportunities will be un-
exploited with probability one. However, a substantial proportion of betting on Betfair
is carried out algorithmically. Betfair provide an Application Programming Interface to
encourage the use of automated betting strategies, which should make it cost-effective
to monitor markets continuously and quickly exploit arbitrage opportunities.
We find that two legitimate limits to arbitrage remain. Firstly, transaction costs
play a part. Bettors must pay a commission on their net winnings in each market, ren-
dering some arbitrage opportunities unprofitable.3 Second, collateral must be posted in
order to take advantage of any arbitrage. This collateral is not returned until the end
of the match, by which time larger arbitrage opportunities may have arisen. Collateral
requirements lend an element of irreversibility to the enactment of an arbitrage, and
could therefore mean that a high return must be exacted for the arbitrageur to exercise
their ‘option to arbitrage’. The requirement to post collateral also impedes the arbi-
trageur in Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Liu and Longstaff (2004) and Kondor (2009);
3This effect is found elsewhere. Rosenthal and Young (1990) examine the pricing efficiency of
so-called Siamese-twin stocks, which have clearly specified proportional rights to a parent company’s
cash-flows. It was found that transaction costs limit the returns to an arbitrage of pricing discrepancies
between the two stocks.
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models in which the arbitrageur can lose money in the short-run. We find persistent
arbitrage opportunities without any significant short-term risk. This the first piece of
empirical evidence that collateral requirements do indeed limit arbitrage.
In light of the two limits observed we propose two alterations to the design of this
particular market. Firstly, at present, transaction costs take the form of commission
charged on the net winnings on a market. As the win and set-betting markets are
classified as separate markets, a significant proportion of arbitrage opportunities are
no longer profitable once commission is included. This would suggest that arbitrage
would be encouraged by classifying any markets related to the same sporting event as
a single market. In a similar fashion, bettors are required to post collateral for their
liabilities in both the win market and the set market, even though liabilities in one may
be offset with a position in the other. This would suggest that classifying any markets
related to the same sporting event as a single market would also eliminate the collateral
requirement limit to arbitrage.
Other authors have looked at arbitrage in betting markets. In a recent paper,
Marshall (2009) examined arbitrage opportunities in internet sport betting with book-
makers. He found that arbitrage opportunities offered median returns of 1.5%, and
lasted for a median duration of 15 minutes.4 The novelty of our data is that our ar-
bitrageurs can operate on one exchange, rather than requiring accounts with a series
of bookmakers. In addition, the option of taking a short position on a bet, offered
by betting exchanges, means that arbitrage opportunities arise more frequently. This
is particularly apparent during matches, when meaningful information is constantly
arriving and affecting prices.
Finally, bookmakers have the legal right in many jurisdictions to cancel any bet
at any time. If one element of an arbitrage trade is cancelled, the arbitrageur may
be forced to replace the cancelled bet with another bet which renders the arbitrage
4For other examples of arbitrage in betting markets, see Hausch and Ziemba (1990), Edelman and
O’ Brian (2004), and Lane and Ziemba (2004). The efficiency of tennis betting markets, with respect to
expected returns, is considered in Forrest and McHale (2007). For a general survey of betting market
efficiency, see Vaughan Williams (2005).
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unprofitable. On the betting exchange used here, those providing liquidity have only a
1-5 second window to cancel a bet.5 This means that any effect of cancellation risk on
the enaction of arbitrage should be negligible.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.2 we describe an illustrative
arbitrage strategy. Section 6.3 outlines the data and includes summary statistics of the
arbitrage opportunities. Section 6.4 concludes. All proofs of arbitrage strategies are in
the Appendix.
5.2 Example: Arbitrage Strategy
Bets on Betfair, a prominent U.K. betting exchange, can be traded on a player to win
a tennis match and also the score by which the player wins. Bets take the form of a
back bet (where the odds plus stake are returned if the outcome occurs) and a lay bet
(where the bettor is liable for the odds if the outcome occurs, but pockets the stake if
it does not).
Our example strategy involves backing a player to win, and simultaneously laying
all the possible set-betting outcomes involved in that player winning. Consider a best-
of-five set match. The player can win 3-0, 3-1, 3-2, or lose. Suppose that the back odds
on a win are BW , and the lay odds on a 3-0 win, 3-1 win, and 3-2 win are L0, L1 and
L2 respectively.
Suppose also, for initial simplicity, that commission is paid on the net winnings
from this arbitrage. In order to guarantee an equal return, whatever the outcome of
the match, an arbitrageur should lay BW+1
L0+1
, BW+1
L1+1
and BW+1
L2+1
units on the player to win
3-0, 3-1 and 3-2 respectively, for every 1 unit placed on the player to win.
In fact, commission is paid on net winnings for each market where the win and set
markets are classified separately. The initial commission charged to Betfair customers
is 5%, but this can decline to as low as 2% dependent on the frequency of the customer’s
betting. We denote the commission rate as c ∈ [0.02, 0.05].
5http://help.betfair.com/contents/itemId/i65767339/index.en.html
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In order to guarantee an identical return no matter what the outcome of the match,
the arbitrageur should lay x = a+(f+zg+z)b
1−gb
, y = f+(a+zb+z)g
1−gb
and z =
h+
(a+fb+f+ag)j
1−gb
1−
((g+1)b−(b+1)g)j
1−gb
on the player to win 3-0, 3-1 and 3-2 respectively - where a = BW (1−c)+1
L0+1−c
, b = c
L0+1−c
,
f = BW (1−c)+1
L1+1−c
, g = c
L1+1−c
, h = BW (1−c)+1
L2+1−c
and j = c
L2+1−c
- for every 1 unit on the
player to win. The returns for this arbitrage strategy are r = (x+y+z)(1−c)−w
w+xL0+yL1+zL2
.
In what follows, we consider the returns to this arbitrage and also the opposite
trade, where the set outcomes are backed and the win outcome is laid. The proofs for
both arbitrage strategies are in the Appendix.
5.3 Data
Betting pricing data was obtained from Fracsoft, a company contracted to market Bet-
fair historical pricing data. This data includes the second-by-second quoted odds, and
associated volumes, for betting in a range of tennis matches. For our study we looked at
data on 13 matches from the quarter-final stage onwards of the Men’s Wimbledon Ten-
nis Championships in 2008 and 2009.6 These matches were chosen as they were likely
to display a high degree of liquidity. There are four arbitrage strategies per match so
we evaluated 52 arbitrage strategies over a cumulative total of more than 77 hours of
play.
To give an example of the analysis of arbitrage opportunities, consider the Final
in 2008, which was contested by Roger Federer (ranked number 1 in the world) and
Rafael Nadal (ranked number 2). As an indication of the betting interest in this match,
Betfair matched GBP 28,334,894 on Nadal to win and GBP 20,802,434 on Federer to
win by the end of the match.
For this match we looked at the returns to four arbitrage strategies. 1) back Nadal
in the win market, lay Nadal in the set market; 2) back Nadal in the set market, lay
Nadal in the win market; 3) back Federer in the win market, lay Federer in the set
market; and 4) back Federer in the set market, lay Federer in the win market.
6Data on a fourth quarter-final in 2008 was unavailable.
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We examined the returns to arbitrage whilst all three possible set outcomes were
still possible. As liquidity builds up prior to a match, and steadily declines as the
number of possible outcomes falls, this is the most liquid time of the market, and gives
us the greatest possibility of arbitrage opportunities. For the first two strategies, this
window lasts 2972 seconds. For the last two strategies, this window lasts 14328 seconds.
The reason for this difference is that Nadal won the first set after 2972 seconds, thereby
ruling out a 3-0 Federer win, whilst Federer did not win a set until the third set, after
14328 seconds, thereby ruling out a 3-0 Nadal win.
Table 6.1 details the summary statistics of arbitrage opportunities for the four strate-
gies outlined above. Frequency of arbitrage is calculated as the ratio of the number
of seconds where there is an arbitrage opportunity, divided by the number of seconds
where there is liquidity (i.e. at least one quote) for all of the 4 betting options involved
in the arbitrage. The arbitrage returns are described for commission levels of 0%, 2%
and 5%. A 5% commission on net winnings is charged for those customers who have
not accrued any loyalty points with Betfair. It is possible for the most frequent bettors
to reduce the commission level they pay to 2%.
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0%
Strategy Freq. Returns Duration N
(%) (%) (seconds)
Median IQ Range Max Median IQ Range Max
1 36 0.47 0.9 4.9 7 14 575 14236
2 4.1 1.1 1.6 10 7.5 13 110 14236
3 23 0.42 0.66 3.9 8 19 120 2970
4 22 0.92 1.4 5.2 10 16 239 2970
2%
Strategy Freq. Returns Duration N
(%) (%) (seconds)
Median IQ Range Max Median IQ Range Max
1 22 0.58 0.87 4.6 6 11 307 14236
2 2.1 0.98 1.9 8.9 4 6 47 14236
3 14 0.4 0.7 3.5 10 14 75 2970
4 10 0.84 1.2 4.1 7 12 135 2970
5%
Strategy Freq. Returns Duration N
(%) (%) (seconds)
Median IQ Range Max Median IQ Range Max
1 13 0.58 0.74 4.2 5 10 92 14236
2 0.81 1 1.7 7.1 5 8.5 33 14236
3 5.9 0.39 0.37 3 4 6 63 2970
4 2.2 0.31 0.25 2.4 9.5 6.8 17 2970
Table 6.1. The summary statistics of arbitrage opportunities for strategies 1 to 4 during the Nadal Federer Wimbledon
Final in 2008, for commission levels of 0%, 2%, and 5%. Data is taken while all three set outcomes are still possible.
Frequency is calculated as the ratio of the number of seconds where there is an arbitrage opportunity, divided by the
number of seconds where there is liquidity (i.e. at least one quote) for all of the 4 betting options involved in the
arbitrage.
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We find that a 5% commission level renders a substantial proportion of arbitrage
opportunities unprofitable. For example, in strategy 4, arbitrage opportunities occur
with a frequency of 22% if commission is 0%, and with a frequency of 10% and 2.2%
for commissions of 2% and 5% respectively. The charging of commission substantially
decreases the pool of possible arbitrages, but opportunities are still relatively frequent,
especially for regular users of Betfair.
In Table 6.2 we describe the duration and returns to each arbitrage strategy for
the full 13 matches, assuming a commission level of 2%, as arbitrageurs are likely
to be regular users of Betfair. Arbitrage strategies arise in all 13 matches studied,
and 39 of the 52 strategies produce an arbitrage opportunity. Of these 39 strategies,
median returns to arbitrage range from 0.0039% (Lopez/Safin strategy 3) to 1.205%
(Djokovic/Hass strategy 1). Given the short-time frame, and the frequency with which
new opportunities arise, these returns are economically significant. Certain arbitrage
opportunities yield returns of 8.5% (Murray/Nadal strategy 3) and 8.9% (Nadal/Federer
strategy 2).
The arbitrage opportunities described have a median duration ranging from 1 sec-
ond (Roddick/Hewitt strategy 3) to 62 seconds (Lopez/Safin strategy 1). Certain ar-
bitrage strategies last up to 163 seconds (Lopez/Safin strategy 2) and 307 seconds
(Nadal/Federer strategy 1). The execution speed for an algorithmic trader, using the
Application Programming Interface provided by Betfair, will vary dependent on their
location and the speed of their computer. The consensus on the Betfair Developers
Program Forum (http://forum.bdp.betfair.com/) and related blogs is that a U.K. res-
ident should be able to execute trades in 125-500 milliseconds, which is comfortably
below the median duration of arbitrage opportunities observed in our study.
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Match Strategy Freq. Returns Duration N
(%) (%) (seconds)
Median IQ Range Max Median IQ Range Max
2008
Nadal/Federer 1 22 0.58 0.87 4.6 6 11 307 14236
2 2.1 0.98 1.9 8.9 4 6 47 14236
3 14 0.4 0.7 3.5 10 14 75 2970
4 10 0.84 1.2 4.1 7 12 135 2970
Nadal/Schuettler 1 13 0.48 0.7 6.5 7 8 35 7470
2 3.4 1.3 1.6 11 5.5 9 34 7470
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 674
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 674
Federer/Safin 1 8.2 0.24 0.42 1.3 6 15 85 6187
2 0.39 1.2 2.2 2.6 12 3 15 6187
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1515
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1515
Murray/Nadal 1 1.6 0.23 0.13 0.28 10 5.5 12 2149
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2149
3 19 0.4 0.55 8.5 9 12 109 6968
4 0.06 0.75 0.58 1 4 0 4 6968
Ancic/Federer 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1224
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1224
3 2.4 0.39 0.58 2.1 20 23 110 14159
4 0.01 0.47 0 0.47 2 0 2 14159
Lopez/Safin 1 4.1 0.52 0.88 4.5 62 63 120 12658
2 2.2 0.51 1.4 2.4 18 11 163 12658
3 0.77 0 0.09 0.22 2 24 50 10254
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10254
2009
Roddick/Federer 1 6.45 0.19 0.15 0.77 4 6 67 5032
2 0.28 0.11 0.73 1.3 4 2 7 5032
3 2.46 0.12 0.07 0.57 2 3 9 2395
4 3.97 0.29 0.26 3.08 5 4.75 36 2395
Murray/Roddick 1 2.2 0.02 0.13 0.88 7 9.75 31 2259
2 5.53 0.63 0.62 2.12 4 13.25 37 2259
3 1.88 0.22 0.36 0.75 3 4 26 4333
4 4.62 0.63 0.83 2.6 8 10.75 73 4333
Federer/Hass 1 1.5 0.1 0.13 0.45 4 3.25 13 7370
2 1.6 0.36 0.37 2.89 7 5.5 22 7370
3 1.11 0.04 0.04 0.04 7 11.5 14 2805
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2805
Karlovic/Federer 1 1.35 0.11 0 0.11 7 0 7 1352
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1352
3 2.03 0.53 0.36 0.84 16 10.75 27 6186
4 0.18 0.30 2.33 2.62 3 1 5 6186
Roddick/Hewitt 1 6.42 0.58 0.74 2.58 6 6.5 21 5334
2 0.09 0.43 0.37 0.43 3 0.50 3 5334
3 26.09 0.63 0 0.63 1 0 1 1646
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1646
Djokovic/Hass 1 1.61 1.21 0.5 1.97 12 0 12 2744
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2744
3 0.24 0.76 0.31 0.87 3 3 8 7879
4 3.69 0.64 0.81 4.85 6 10.75 73 7879
Murray/Ferrero 1 3.9 0.22 0.25 1.58 4 8.25 63 6140
2 1.49 0.74 0.32 3.29 7 6 19 6140
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2726
4 16.87 0.61 0.74 2.02 6 48 144 2726
Table 6.2. The summary statistics of arbitrage opportunities - for 6 matches from the 2008 Wimbledon Championships and 7 matches
from the 2009 Championships - for an assumed working commission level of 2%. Data is taken while all three set outcomes are still
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possible. For each match, strategy 1 (3) is to back the first (second) player in the win market and lay the same player in the set market,
and strategy 2 (4) is to lay the first (second) player in the win market and back the same player in the set market. Frequency is calculated
as the ratio of the number of seconds where there is an arbitrage opportunity, divided by the number of seconds where there is liquidity
(i.e. at least one quote) for all of the 4 betting options involved in the arbitrage.
The puzzle remains, therefore, as to why some opportunities are left, at least tem-
porarily, on the table. The remaining limit to arbitrage is the requirement to post
collateral in separate markets. An arbitrageur has only a finite amount of capital to
post as collateral, so may defer taking certain arbitrage opportunities because of the
possibility of a greater opportunity in the future. As arbitrage opportunities are fre-
quent in this environment, it would be reasonable for an arbitrageur to expect another,
possibly better, opportunity to arise before the end of the market.
At present an arbitrageur must pay commission, and post collateral for their liabil-
ities, in both the set and the win market. If all markets related to the same sporting
event were classified as a single market, with commission and collateral contingent on
the net revenues/liabilities on this sporting event, this would remove the remaining two
limits to arbitrage. The arbitrageur could take an opportunity without losing the abil-
ity to take any that subsequently arise. It would be interesting to see whether market
efficiency is then realised.
5.4 Conclusion
The limits to arbitrage literature describes the structural impediments which prevent
arbitrage from maintaining market efficiency. The most prominent limit to arbitrage
is noise trader risk; where prices can move further from the fundamental value of an
asset, at least in the short-run, discouraging the actions of arbitrageurs.
In this chapter we examined arbitrage opportunities in a market where there is no
noise trader risk. According to the literature there are now only two possible limits to
arbitrage in this environment. A transaction cost, payable in the form of commission
on winnings, limits the profitability of arbitrage. We are able to quantify this trans-
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action cost, and therefore we are left with one possible explanation for the arbitrage
opportunities that persist: collateral requirements.
As collateral would be tied up until the end of the market, the arbitrageur may
require a larger arbitrage return now in order to forsake the option to use the same
collateral in a subsequent arbitrage opportunity. In this sense, the decision to arbitrage
is like any other decision to invest under uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
Deciding to invest when the NPV of an arbitrage is greater than zero ignores the
irreversibility that collateral requirements inject into the decision to arbitrage.
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Appendix
Arbitrage Strategies
Recall that the back odds for a win were BW , and the lay odds were L0, L1, L2 for a
3-0, 3-1, and 3-2 win respectively. Also recall that the commission, c ∈ [0.02, 0.05], is
paid on the net winnings in the win market, and the net winnings in the set market. If
the player in question loses, then the revenue after commission is (x+y+ z)(1− c)−w.
No commission is paid in the win market as a loss is incurred. If the player wins,
then commission is only paid in the win market, as the set markets can be expected
to yield a net loss. The revenue after commission is wBW (1 − c) + y + z − xL0,
wBW (1 − c) + x + z − yL1 and wBW (1 − c) + x + y − zL2 for a 3-0, 3-1 and 3-2
win respectively, subject to y + z − xL0 < 0, x + z − yL1 < 0 and x + y − zL2 < 0
respectively. For our arbitrage we require that the revenue after commission is equal
whatever the outcome of the match. After rearranging, w = 1, x = BW (1−c)+(y+z)c
L0+1−c
,
y = BW (1−c)+(x+z)c
L1+1−c
and z = BW (1−c)+(x+y)c
L2+1−c
. To solve the three simultaneous equations,
define a = BW (1−c)+1
L0+1−c
, b = c
L0+1−c
, f = BW (1−c)+1
L1+1−c
, g = c
L1+1−c
, h = BW (1−c)+1
L2+1−c
and
j = c
L2+1−c
. This leaves x = a+(f+zg+z)b
1−gb
, y = f+(a+zb+z)g
1−gb
and z =
h+
(a+fb+f+ag)j
1−gb
1−
((g+1)b−(b+1)g)j
1−gb
. The
collateral required to enact this arbitrage is w+xL0+yL1+zL2 so the arbitrage return
is r = (x+y+z)(1−c)−w
w+xL0+yL1+zL2
. 
Now suppose that the opposite arbitrage is carried out. The win bet is laid, and
the set bets are backed. The lay odds on offer for a win are LW , and the back odds
are B0, B1 and B2, for a 3-0, 3-1 and 3-2 win respectively. w will be laid on the win
bet, with x, y and z backed on the 3-0, 3-1 and 3-2 win respectively. If the player in
question loses then the net revenue after commission is w(1− c)− x− y − z. The net
revenue after commission is (xB0−y−z)(1−c)−wLW , (yB1−x−z)(1−c)−wLW and
(zB2−x− y)(1− c)−wLW for a 3-0, 3-1 and 3-2 win respectively. In order to secure a
uniform return no matter what the outcome of the match, w = 1, x = wLW+w(1−c)−(y+z)c
B0(1−c)+1
,
y = wLW+w(1−c)−(x+z)c
B1(1−c)+1
and z = wLW+w(1−c)−(x+y)c
B2(1−c)+1
. To solve the three simultaneous
equations, set a = LW+(1−c)
B0(1−c)+1
, b = c
B0(1−c)+1
, f = LW+(1−c)
B1(1−c)+1
, g = c
B1(1−c)+1
, h = LW+(1−c)
B2(1−c)+1
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and j = c
B2(1−c)+1
. Then x = a−b(f−gz+z)
1−gb
, y = f−g(a−bz+z)
1−gb
and z =
h−
(a−fb+f−ag)j
1−gb
1+ 2bjg−jb−jg
1−gb
. The
collateral required to enact this arbitrage is wLW + x + y + z so the return for this
strategy is w(1−c)−x−y−z
wLW+x+y+z
. 
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